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PROVIDING A FOUNDATION FOR 
WEALTH CREATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE ROLE 
OF THE RULE OF LAW 
John Mukum Mbaku* 
INTRODUCTION 
frica of the mid-to-late twentieth century was a continent 
afflicted with many ills—extremely inefficiently managed 
economies; high levels of political and bureaucratic corruption; 
capriciousness and arbitrariness in the delivery of public goods 
and services; rampant military intervention in politics; violent 
and destructive ethnic mobilization, some of which resulted in 
brutal civil wars; ecosystem degradation; and generally very 
poor economic performance.1 Such an environment could hardly 
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 1.  For a review of these issues see generally WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT IN  SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (World Bank, 
1981) [hereinafter ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA]; 
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY [OAU], THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA 1980–2000, at 4, 6, 42, 77 (1981), availa-
ble at http://www.nepadst.org/doclibrary/pdfs/lagos_plan.pdf; PREPARING 
AFRICA FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL 
COEXISTENCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (John Mukum Mbaku ed., 
1999); JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUBLIC 
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (1997) [hereinafter MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN 
AFRICA]; JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
(2004) [hereinafter MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT]; CORRUPTION 
AND THE CRISIS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN AFRICA (John Mukum Mbaku 
ed., 1998) [hereinafter CORRUPTION AND THE CRISIS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
REFORMS]; JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND CLEANUPS (2010) [hereinafter MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN 
AFRICA]. 
A
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have been considered attractive to domestic investors, let alone 
those from outside the continent. The political and economic 
uncertainties brought about by these events led not only to Af-
rica’s failure to attract foreign investment, but also to capital 
flight as domestic savers sought investment opportunities in 
more stable economies abroad.2 
In the mid-1980s, however, grassroots pro-democracy move-
ments emerged in many African countries. Riding on the wave 
of the global struggle for change that had begun in the Iberian 
Peninsula in the mid-1970s, the pro-democracy movements 
successfully toppled various civilian and military dictatorships, 
paving the way for significant improvements in governance.3 
Later, buoyed by the collapse of the brutal and inhumane 
apartheid system in South Africa, 4  Africa’s pro-democracy 
movements successfully established an enabling environment 
                                                                                                             
 2. See IMF, EXTERNAL DEBT AND CAPITAL FLIGHT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
(S. Ibi Ajayi & Mohsin S. Khan eds., 2000) (examining the continent’s twin 
evils of capital flight and increasing external debts and offering reasons for 
such a state of affairs); Léonce Ndikumana & James K. Boyce, Africa’s Re-
volving Door: External Borrowing and Capital Flight in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA 132–51 (Vishhnu Padayachee ed., 
2010) (showing that political instability in Africa is a major cause of capital 
flight). Note that capital, as used here, includes both financial and human 
capital. During the last several decades, many highly skilled and educated 
Africans have exited their economies and migrated to Europe, North Ameri-
ca, the Middle East, and various parts of East Asia, notably Australia and 
New Zealand, in search of opportunities to make more effective use of their 
skills and, at the same time, avoid being subjected to the vagaries of authori-
tarian rule in their home countries. 
 3. See generally THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: 
THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere eds., 
2003) [hereinafter TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE] (providing a de-
tailed analysis of Africa’s transition to democratic governance, which began 
in the mid-1980s); POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN 
AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY EXPERIENCES (Julius O. Ihonvbere & John 
Mukum Mbaku eds., 2003) (examining Africa’s transition to democratic gov-
ernance with specific emphasis on the experiences of a number of countries). 
 4. See, e.g., PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE: THE END OF 
APARTHEID AND THE BIRTH OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1997) (providing an 
eyewitness account of events leading to the demise of one of the most brutal 
and inhumane governmental regimes ever devised by man); RICHARD TAMES, 
THE END OF APARTHEID: A NEW SOUTH AFRICA (examining critical milestones 
in the evolution and demise of the apartheid system in South Africa). 
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for the continent’s transition to democratic governance.5 Thus, 
Africa’s political economy in the twenty-first century has been 
significantly different from that which characterized the conti-
nent in the previous century. While many problems remain, 
investors—both domestic and foreign—are beginning to see the 
continent as an emerging market for both trade and invest-
ment. After many decades of extremely poor governance and 
dismal economic performance, thanks to reforms developed and 
implemented during the last four decades or so, Africa is poised 
to become a global center for significant economic activities. 
According to the World Bank, as many as thirty-six govern-
ments in sub-Saharan Africa have significantly improved their 
economies’ regulatory environments, leading to increased trade 
and investment.6 
Additionally, the reforms that have taken place in the conti-
nent since the mid-1980s have paved the way for the growth of 
a robust civil society, which is gradually taking an active part 
in governance—in fact, in countries such as Ghana and South 
Africa, civil society has become an important check on the gov-
ernment.7 And, in Egypt and Tunisia, civil society and its or-
ganizations were responsible for toppling long-serving auto-
cratic rulers and paving the way for these countries to acceler-
ate their transition to democratic governance and the rule of 
law.8 
                                                                                                             
 5. For a thorough review of some of the changes that opened up political 
spaces for participation by popular forces, and hence enhanced the conti-
nent’s transition to more effective governance systems, see MULTIPARTY 
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CHANGE: CONSTRAINTS TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN 
AFRICA (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere eds., 2006). 
 6. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2012: DOING BUSINESS IN A MORE 
TRANSPARENT WORLD 1–2 (2011). 
 7. See EMMANUEL GYIMAH-BOADI, MIKE OQUAYE & F.K. DRAH, CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND GHANAIAN DEMOCRATIZATION (2000) (examining 
the role of civil society in Ghana’s democratization); THE STATE OF THE 
PEOPLE: CITIZENS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1994–
2000 (Bert Klandermans, Marlene Roefs & Johan Olivier eds., 2001) (detail-
ing the role played by citizens and their organizations in the transformation 
of South Africa from the apartheid-induced dictatorship to participatory and 
inclusive democratic governance). 
 8. ASHRAF KHALIL, LIBERATION SQUARE: INSIDE THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 
AND THE REBIRTH OF A NATION (2011) (discussing, inter alia, the role of non-
governmental organizations and civil society organizations in Egypt’s recent 
“revolution”); IGNACIO GARCIA MARIN, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRACY 
AND INTERNET: TUNISIAN REVOLUTION (2011) (drawing lessons from the use of 
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Along with the rise of civil society, which is helping improve 
governance in the continent, there have been discoveries of sig-
nificant natural resources in various countries that are likely 
to provide the catalyst for growth. In addition to Ghana, Kenya 
and Uganda have discovered considerable deposits of petrole-
um and arrangements are already underway to exploit these 
resources and make the proceeds available for investment in 
various sectors of national economies.9 Finally, many developed 
countries have taken a renewed interest in investing in Africa. 
For example, since 1998, the People’s Republic of China 
(“PRC”) has significantly increased its volume of trade and in-
vestments in Africa.10 In addition, China’s former president, 
Hu Jintao, made several official trips to the continent and 
many African heads-of-state have been brought to China to 
consult with the PRC’s business and political leaders, including 
Salva Kiir Mayardit, president of South Sudan, Africa’s latest 
independent country. Significant contact between Africa and 
the PRC during the last several decades has resulted in China 
emerging as Africa’s biggest trade and investment partner.11 
According to Ching, “[t]he speed with which China has engaged 
with the continent is breathtaking, with two-way trade rising 
about 30 percent each year so far in the 21st century, reaching 
a record [US]$166 billion in 2011.”12 
Recently, the United States has indicated an interest in im-
proving its trade relations with Africa. Members in both houses 
of Congress introduced the “Increasing American Jobs Through 
Greater Exports to Africa Act of 2012,” (HR 4221/SB 2215) a 
bill designed to increase U.S. economic engagement with the 
                                                                                                             
the Internet by Tunisian civil society to overthrow their country’s autocratic 
regime). 
 9. See, e.g., DUNCAN CLARKE, CRUDE CONTINENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
AFRICA’S OIL PRIZE (2008) (providing a historical review of Africa’s oil re-
sources and the scramble by multinational companies for them). 
 10. See, e.g., THE NEW PRESENCE OF CHINA IN AFRICA (Meine Pieter van 
Dijk ed., 2009) (detailing the evolution of Chinese economic activities in Afri-
ca). 
 11. Frank Ching, China Deepening Aid and Trade Ties with Africa, JAPAN 
TIMES (July 28, 2012), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/07/28/commentary/china-
deepening-aid-and-trade-ties-with-africa/#.UXg-vWOTPiQ.  
 12. Id. 
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continent of Africa. 13  These developments—which increased 
Chinese trade with the continent and the recent interest of the 
U.S. Congress to improve the country’s trade relations with Af-
rica—augur well for wealth creation and the eradication of 
poverty in the continent. 
Despite what appears to be an august environment for trade 
and investment in Africa, it is important to recognize that the 
type of economic growth that results in development—that is, 
growth that produces significant improvements in human con-
ditions, especially for the poorest 20% of the population—
cannot take place in Africa under the existing institutional en-
vironment. Granted, since the mid-1980s, there have been sig-
nificant social, economic, and political transformations in the 
continent. In fact, governance systems have improved in most 
of the continent. Yet, as recent events in Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Libya have shown, most African countries have yet to deepen 
and institutionalize democracy and hence, provide themselves 
with legal and judicial systems that guarantee the rule of law. 
For one thing, Africans, like their counterparts in other parts of 
the world, are not just interested in increases in the gross do-
mestic product—they want to participate in the creation of that 
wealth and receive their equitable share of all the proceeds of 
economic growth. They want to live in peace with their neigh-
bors; they want to get married and raise families; they want to 
live free of government tyranny; they want to use their talents 
and resources to create the wealth that they need to meet their 
obligations; they do not want their values infringed upon by 
either state or non-state actors; and they want to be able to 
govern themselves.14 What they want is human development, 
                                                                                                             
 13. S. 2215, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 4221, 112th Cong. (2012). It is im-
portant to note that this bill died in committee in 2012. In addition, the Sen-
ate version of the bill states that its goal is “increasing United States exports 
to Africa by at least 200 percent in real dollar value within 10 years.” 
 14. Charles Manga Fombad has studied constitutional reforms in Came-
roon. Specifically, he has examined the reforms that produced the 1996 Cam-
eroon Constitution (officially known as Law No. 96-06 of 18 January 1996 to 
Amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972) and concluded that their outcomes 
were not institutional arrangements that enhanced the rule of law or signifi-
cantly improved governance. He added that “[t]he [1996] constitution has 
rendered in one sweep the future of Cameroon’s fledgling democracy bleak.” 
In addition, Fombad argues that “[a]nother glaring disappointment is the 
failure of this constitution [i.e., the 1996 Constitution], like its predecessors, 
to formally recognise and protect Cameroon’s bi-jural legal heritage.” Charles 
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not just increases in GDP. Unfortunately, most African coun-
tries, including those such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya that 
have recently gone through “revolutions,” have not yet trans-
formed their political economies well enough to create institu-
tional environments capable of promoting and sustaining sig-
nificant improvements in human development. To promote 
genuine and sustained human development in Africa, each 
country must undertake necessary reforms to provide itself 
with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law. 
Specifically, each country must engage its citizens in democrat-
ic constitution-making to produce institutional arrangements 
that adequately constrain civil servants and political elites, 
provide the wherewithal for the effective management of ethnic 
and religious diversity, and promote entrepreneurial activities 
and the creation of wealth, especially among historically mar-
ginalized and deprived groups. Such a set of institutional ar-
rangements is characterized by a general adherence and fideli-
ty to the rule of law.15 
                                                                                                             
Manga Fombad, Judicial Power in Cameroon’s Amended Constitution of 18 
January 1996, 9 LESOTHO L.J. 1, 10 (1996) [hereinafter Fombad, Judicial 
Power in Cameroon’s Amended Constitution]. Fombad also states that 
“[a]lthough the amended Constitution professes to institute, for the first time, 
what it terms ‘judicial power,’ this is largely ineffective because of the Presi-
dent’s unlimited powers to appoint and dismiss judges.” CHARLES MANGA 
FOMBAD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CAMEROON 31–32 (2012) [hereinafter 
FOMBAD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. In 2008, Cameroon’s National Assembly 
amended the constitution again, but the outcome was not an improved set of 
rules. For one thing, the new constitution paved the way for the President of 
the Republic, Paul Biya, to become president-for-life—Article 6(2) abolishes 
the two-term limit imposed by the 1996 Constitution and allows the Presi-
dent to run for re-election indefinitely. Law No 2008/001 of 14 April 2008 to 
Amend and Supplement Some Provisions of Law No. 96-06 to Amend the 
Constitution of 2 June 1972 (“Constitution of Cameroon 2008”), art. 6(1). In 
addition, Article 53(3) of the same constitution grants the President of the 
Republic immunity from prosecution for any criminal acts committed by him 
while in office. Law No. 2008/001 of 14 April 2008 to Amend and Supplement 
Some Provisions of Law No. 96-06 of 18 January 1996 to Amend the Consti-
tution of 2 June 1972 (“Constitution of Cameroon 2008”). 
 15. See, e.g., MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 
267–302 (emphasizing the importance of institutions to development in Afri-
ca). Here, “human development” involves much more than increases in the 
national output. Certainly, the increased wealth associated with the higher 
GDP may, under the appropriate institutional environment, provide the addi-
tional resources needed to significantly improve national standards of living. 
Whether such economic growth would lead to improvements in the standard 
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This research seeks to accomplish the following objectives: (i) 
emphasize the need to complete Africa’s transition, which be-
gan in the 1980s, and produce within each country governance 
structures that guarantee the rule of law; and (ii) show that 
while there have been significant institutional changes in the 
continent during the last several decades, genuine human de-
velopment in Africa requires the institutionalization, in each 
country, of the rule of law. 
The methodology that is employed in this study is James M. 
Buchanan’s16 constitutional political economy model, which an-
alyzes how societies formulate, select, and amend the rules 
that regulate their sociopolitical interactions. Rules, which Ad-
                                                                                                             
of living, especially for the bottom half of the population, would be deter-
mined by the nature of the country’s institutional arrangements. For exam-
ple, in a country in which the citizens enjoy a significant level of economic 
freedom—that is, where the right to engage freely in exchange and contract-
ing is constitutionally guaranteed and entrenched—and most citizens are 
well-educated and possess the skills required by the productive sector, the 
rise in the GDP or economic growth would come primarily from the contribu-
tions of these citizens. Income distribution would reflect such contributions—
that is, the bulk of the people would benefit from economic growth, leading to 
significant increases in development. However, if growth derives primarily 
from the export of raw materials such as oil, the production of which does not 
utilize significant amounts of local labor, then little or no income would ac-
crue to domestic labor and it would be left to the government to effect the 
necessary redistributions of income. Unfortunately, for many countries in the 
region, high levels of corruption have usually made such redistributions inef-
fective as a way to stimulate development. Besides, redistribution of income 
is not a sustainable way to enhance development. Development involves more 
than providing citizens with access to more financial resources. Citizens want 
to have the opportunity to create wealth for themselves, and not depend on 
the government or some other external source to provide it to them. Citizens 
want self-respect and the right to participate in community and family life. In 
Africa, ethnic and religious groups want to be able to practice their religions, 
cultures, and traditions without interference from state or non-state actors. 
Where the rule of law exists, citizens have a much better chance of achieving 
genuine development. See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, Entrenching Economic 
Freedom in Africa, 23 CATO J. 217 (2003); THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha Cra-
ven Nussbaum & Amartya Kumar Sen eds., 1993) (elaborating on the concept 
of development and providing a working definition for development that goes 
beyond increases in per capita income). 
 16. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS AND THE ETHICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 3–18 (1994). 
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am Smith called “laws and institutions,”17 have a significant 
impact on, and to a great extent determine the outcomes that 
result from sociopolitical interaction. Brennan and Buchanan 
argue that while rules enhance the ability of individuals to 
maximize their values, which may include engaging in wealth-
creating activities, they do so in a context in which they do not 
prevent others from doing the same.18 That is, in providing citi-
zens with the tools to organize their private lives and maximize 
their values, rules also serve the “negative function of prevent-
ing disastrous harm.”19 
Throughout the continent, although governance systems have 
improved significantly, many citizens still face rules that em-
power their governors to oppress, exploit, and infantilize 
them.20 This is due partly to the fact that the process through 
which these rules were selected was top-down, elite-driven, and 
non-participatory. Such a non-democratic approach to constitu-
tion-making produced rules that were not locally-focused and 
did not reflect the values and interests of each country’s rele-
vant stakeholders. Of course, because they were not selected by 
the people themselves, these rules were not relevant to the 
problems that the various groups in each African country faced 
on a daily basis, and hence, could not help them organize their 
private lives. Instead, the rules served primarily the inter-
ests—specifically for primitive accumulation—of the ruling 
classes. 
Peaceful coexistence and wealth creation in Africa, in par-
ticular, and human development in general, require state re-
                                                                                                             
 17. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 106 (Edwin Cannan ed., University of Chicago Press 
1976) (1887). 
 18. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 14 (1985). 
 19. Id. 
 20. For an example, see Cameroon’s 2008 Constitution, an amended ver-
sion of the 1996 Constitution. The 2008 Constitution retained the enormous 
powers vested in the president of the Republic by the 1996 Constitution. In 
addition, it provided the opportunity for the extant president, Paul Biya, to 
become president-for-life, as well as granted the president immunity from 
prosecution for any criminal acts committed by him while in office. See Law 
No. 2008/001 of 14 April 2008 to Amend and Supplement some Provisions of 
Law No. 96-06 of 18 January 1996 to Amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972; 
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, arts. 6(1), 53(3); FOMBAD, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 111. 
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construction and reconstitution through democratic constitu-
tion-making to produce institutional arrangements that guar-
antee the rule of law. This study dissects the elements of the 
rule of law and shows how critical they are to the management 
of ethnic diversity and therefore to the promotion of peaceful 
coexistence, the creation of wealth, the eradication of poverty, 
and the advancement of human development in Africa. 
I. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
A. Colonialism and Its Institutions 
After the annexation and colonization of an African territory 
by a European nation, the colonizer proceeded to impose insti-
tutional arrangements that it hoped would significantly en-
hance its ability to exploit Africa’s large endowments of re-
sources for the benefit of the metropolitan economies.21 Effec-
tive colonization required the colonial power to restructure the 
critical domains (economic, cultural, and bureaucratic) and im-
pose new legal and judicial institutions on the colonies. This 
process was expected to enhance the ability of the European 
colonial elites to subjugate and rule each colony’s population 
groups, and to provide the institutional structure within which 
metropolitan-based mercantile firms could help exploit the re-
sources of the new territories and Christian missionaries could 
sell their version of salvation to “heathen natives.”22 
                                                                                                             
 21. See generally SIR ALAN CUTHBERT BURNS, HISTORY OF NIGERIA (Allen 
and Unwin 1963) (examining British colonization of Nigeria); HARRY R. 
RUDIN, GERMANS IN THE CAMEROONS, 1884–1914: A CASE STUDY IN MODERN 
IMPERIALISM (1968) (detailing the founding of the German colony of Kamerun 
and the subsequent exploitation of its resources by German entrepreneurs). 
 22. For example, when the French took over the administration of the 
eastern part of the former German colony of Kamerun, they faced significant 
opposition from various kingdoms that existed in what is now generally re-
ferred to as French Cameroons. One such kingdom was Bamoun, whose sov-
ereign, Sultan Njoya, had developed a script for the kingdom’s language and 
used it to produce tracts on laws and customs, as well as a volume that out-
lined a “new religion based on Islam, Christianity, and Bamoun traditional 
religious practice.” JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF 
CAMEROON 73 (2005) [hereinafter MBAKU, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF 
CAMEROON]. Sultan Njoya subsequently established royal schools throughout 
the kingdom and instruction was offered using the new script. Additionally, a 
printing press was established to produce materials for education and social 
dialogue. However, after World War I, Bamoun became part of French Came-
roons. As part of their colonial policy, the French introduced a new educa-
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To minimize the costs of exploitation of resources, it was nec-
essary for a European power to devise an effective mechanism 
to manage ethnic and religious diversity in its colonies. The 
colonizer could have taken advantage of existing traditional 
approaches to conflict resolution or helped the new colony de-
velop democratic institutions, which would have provided the 
institutional mechanism for colonial population groups to live 
together peacefully. Instead, the colonizers used their compara-
tive advantage in the employment of violence to force the Afri-
                                                                                                             
tional system and proceeded to destroy the kingdom’s traditional forms of 
instruction: French Christian missions took over administration of schools; 
French became the only legal language of instruction in schools; and a curric-
ulum based on French culture and civilization was introduced and subjects 
relevant to the local populations were disallowed. In addition to destroying 
the king’s printing press and effectively halting the creation of knowledge 
relevant to local development, the French colonial authorities forcefully re-
moved Sultan Njoya and sent him to Yaoundé (then, the capital of French 
Cameroons), where he died in isolation and  away from his people. Id. See 
also John Mukum Mbaku, Copyright and Democratization in Africa, 7 BYU 
INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 51, 53–54 (2011). 
  Shortly after annexation of territories in the Cameroon River District 
in 1884, the German colonial government sought to accord the territories a 
locus standi in the German legal system. However, there was no constitu-
tional discourse within the colonies, nor were the colonial inhabitants grant-
ed an opportunity to either refuse association with Germany, or to determine 
the terms of the arrangement. Instead, Bismarck brought the matter to the 
German Reichstag when he introduced a bill on January 12, 1886. The bill 
was subsequently passed on April 10, 1886. In addition to the fact that citi-
zens of the colony of Kamerun were never consulted during the process of 
writing this “colonial constitution,” subsequent amendments to the law were 
undertaken entirely in Germany—the bill was actually developed or drafted 
by a committee that was significantly influenced by a German planter in 
Kamerun, Adolf Woermann. The new “constitution” vested enormous powers 
in the Kaiser. This “concentration of authority in [the hands of the Kaiser] 
was the legal device through which [German] traders sought to be as unham-
pered in administering and exploiting the colonies as they had been in ac-
quiring them.” RUDIN, supra note 21, at 127–129, 159. Hence, as was typical 
of other colonizers of Africa, the Germans established a colony on the Came-
roon River District in 1884 called Kamerun and introduced laws and institu-
tions that helped them maximize their objectives. According to Adolf Woer-
mann, the leading German trader in Kamerun, these objectives where “in-
creasing German trade, English opposition to German traders generally and 
especially in the court of equity, the need of protecting trade against natives, 
the fear of the French and their high discriminatory duties, and the fear of 
the Congo treaty made by Portugal and England.” Id. at 33. Note that the 
term “metropolitan” as used throughout this Article refers to the country that 
owns the colony, sometimes also referred to as a “mother country.” 
2013] RULE OF LAW 969 
can peoples of different ethnicities and religions together to 
“form a single political and administrative unit.”23 In the Afri-
can colonies with significant concentrations of European set-
tlers,24 the colonial government, with the help of colonists (most 
of whom were miners, farmers and planters), forcefully re-
moved many African groups from their ancestral lands. The 
African groups were then resettled in what came to be known 
as “reservations,” in order to provide more land for European 
economic activities.25 
But, what was the main objective of colonialism? It was the 
maximization of the economic and political interests of the 
metropolitan economies and those of Europeans resident in the 
colonies—namely, settlers or colonists.26 Colonialism was an 
                                                                                                             
 23. John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonbere, Introduction: Issues in Af-
rica’s Political Adjustment in the “New” Global Era, in TRANSITION TO 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 1. 
 24. For example, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South West Africa 
(now Namibia), and the four colonies—Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange 
River Colony, and Transvaal—which united to form the Union of South Afri-
ca in 1910. Id. 
 25. See generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981) (provid-
ing a comparative analysis of race relations in South Africa and the United 
States); BERNARD M. MAGUBANE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACE AND CLASS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA (1979) (examining the impact of race and class on various 
population groups in South Africa, with specific emphasis on the policy of 
apartheid, which became official policy in 1948); PAUL MOSLY, THE SETTLER 
ECONOMIES: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF KENYA AND SOUTHERN 
RHODESIA 1900–1963 (1983) (discussing the impact of settler agriculture on 
political economy in colonial Kenya and Southern Rhodesia); M.W. IMISHUE, 
SOUTH WEST AFRICA: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM (1965) (examining the 
problems created by German and South African colonization of South West 
Africa). 
 26. In each colony, there were three major groups of Europeans. First, set-
tlers or colonists were individual migrants from the various European coun-
tries that intended to make the colony their permanent home. Of course, if 
the colony was French, the majority of European settlers would usually be 
French. Second, there were colonial administrators—the various military and 
civilian elites that were sent to the colonies by the colonizer of record to ad-
minister the colony’s affairs. And third, there were Christian missionaries. 
Most of the colonial settlers were planters, miners, industrialists, and trad-
ers. In the British and French colonies, the interests to be maximized were 
those of Britain and France, and of their citizens resident in the colonies re-
spectively. Similarly, in the French colonies, the interests that dominated 
colonial policies were those of metropolitan France and French citizens locat-
ed in the colony. It is important to note that in some European colonies in 
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insidious, cruel, despotic, and exploitative pact imposed on Af-
rica and Africans by Europeans.27 Colonial institutions were 
instruments of that exploitation and violence. For example, in 
his study of the police in colonial Nigeria, Tamuno concluded 
that the rise of crime and civil disorder provided the impetus 
for the establishment of instruments of violence, such as the 
police, by the United Kingdom. 28  Tamuno argued that in-
creased levels of violence, brought about by “dynastic disputes” 
and interethnic conflicts contributed significantly to a rise in 
criminal activities and “had an important bearing on the origin, 
development and role of [the] modern police [in Nigeria].”29 
This characterization places the police force among the group of 
institutions that were supposed to maintain law and order and 
enhance peaceful coexistence in the colonies.30 
                                                                                                             
Africa, not all Europeans resident in the colonies supported the policies of the 
colonizer of record. For example, in the South African colonies that eventually 
united to form the Union of South Africa in 1910, there were regular conflicts 
between Afrikaners—Europeans of Dutch-German-French ancestry—and the 
colonial government in London over various issues, the most important of 
which included property rights in land and the treatment of Africans, or  “na-
tive tribes.” Some of these disagreements resulted in wars between Afrikan-
ers and the British colonizers, such as the Anglo-Boer war of 1899–1902. See 
generally C.H. THOMAS, ORIGIN OF THE ANGLO-BOER WAR REVEALED (2nd ed., 
Echo Library 2006) (1900); S.B. SPIES, THE ORIGINS OF THE ANGLO-BOER WAR 
(1972). 
 27. Robert Fatton, Jr., Liberal Democracy in Africa, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 455, 
457–58 (1990). Fatton argues that the Europeans imposed themselves and 
their institutions on Africans, and that the latter were never part of what has 
sometimes been referred to as a “mercantile pact,” but were forcefully 
brought into the arrangement. Id. That arrangement produced, for Africans, 
years of humiliation, degradation, and infantilization. Id. 
 28. TEKENA N. TAMUNO, THE POLICE IN MODERN NIGERIA 1861–1965: 
ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND ROLE 10 (1970). 
 29. Id. 
 30. In addition to the fact that such a characterization of the police and 
other colonial institutions misstates the appropriate role of these institutions, 
it also does not make an allowance for the examination of the role that colo-
nialism played in the rise of a significant part of the social and political vio-
lence that came to envelop the colony. Colonialism was a brutal, exploitative, 
and humiliating system, designed specifically to enhance the ability of Euro-
peans to exploit both Africans and their resources. It was inevitable that a 
system conceived in violence and implemented similarly would necessarily 
increase the various forms of violence in the colonies. Most of this so-called 
political and social violence was actually resistance by indigenous groups to 
the activities of the European interlopers. John Mukum Mbaku and Mwangi 
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The characterization of the police and other colonial institu-
tions as instruments of law and order is part of the mistaken 
belief by apologists for European conquest of Africa that coloni-
al occupation was actually a “civilizing” mission “designed to 
prevent African societies from degenerating into anarchy.”31 
Proponents of this view argue that European laws and institu-
tions were designed to provide the colonial government with 
the wherewithal to “civilize” Africa’s perpetually warring fac-
tions and help improve their quality of life, as well as provide 
them with the benefits of the European brand of Christianity.32 
Viewed from this perspective, colonialism was far from being 
cruel or despotic; instead, it was a benevolent and develop-
ment-enhancing enterprise. 
On the contrary, colonialism was not a benevolent enterprise 
designed to benefit Africans. It was a violent and insidious ef-
fort by the Europeans to conquer Africans and exploit their re-
sources for the benefit of the metropolitan economies. For ex-
ample, according to Hugh E. Egerton, an expert on British im-
perial history, the “motives which prompted the European na-
tions upon the field of colonization were in the main two, viz, 
the desire to win converts for the church, and the desire to win 
wealth for themselves.”33 Lord Frederick Lugard, who was re-
sponsible for administering Britain’s policy of indirect rule in 
colonial Nigeria, posited that the colonies represented im-
portant sources of primary commodities for Britain’s domestic 
industries and markets for excess output from metropolitan 
factories.34 Of course, to win converts for the church and pro-
vide opportunities for Britons to enrich themselves, the gov-
ernment of Great Britain could have sought to establish diplo-
matic relations with various African kingdoms and states, with 
the latter allowed to maintain their independence. Once estab-
lished, such inter-state relations, as they are today, would have 
allowed Christian missions to come to the African states and 
peacefully seek converts for their churches, and British entre-
                                                                                                             
S. Kimenyi, Rent Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa, 8 INDIAN J. SOC. 
SCI. 277, 281 (1995). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Hugh E. Egerton, Colonies and the Mercantile System, in IMPERIALISM 
AND COLONIALISM 57, 57 (George H. Nadel & Perry Curtis eds., 1969). 
 34. LORD FREDERICK LUGARD, THE DUAL MANDATE IN TROPICAL AFRICA 7 (3d 
ed., 1926). 
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preneurs and traders would also have been able to seek oppor-
tunities to enter into mutually beneficial exchanges with their 
African counterparts. Of course, at this time in their histories, 
most European countries, including Britain, were practicing 
“mercantilism” and not “capitalism” as we understand it today, 
or as advocated by Adam Smith.35 Hence, the concept of mutu-
ally beneficial trade exchanges would have been alien to exist-
ing practices at the time, since the popular approach was for 
each European country to acquire wealth at the expense of oth-
er countries and, notably, the colonies. Nevertheless, the Brit-
ish chose to employ violent conquest to achieve their objectives 
in Africa. 
The late African political scientist and social commentator 
Professor Claude Ake argued that the colonial project was mo-
tivated primarily by the internal contradictions of capitalism as 
it was then practiced in the European countries.36 He stated 
that: 
[t]he transplanting of capitalism arises from those contradic-
tions which reduce the rate of profit and arrest the capitaliza-
tion of surplus value. Confronted with these effects, it was 
imperative that the capitalist, forever bent on profit maximi-
zation, would look for a new environment in which the process 
of accumulation could proceed apace. Capitalists turned to 
foreign lands attacked and subjugated them and integrated 
their economies to those of Western Europe.37 
Those who initiated the colonial project never pretended to be 
engaged in mutually beneficial trading arrangements between 
Africans and themselves. Even the European settlers who in-
tended to make Africa their permanent home never pretended 
to treat Africans as co-equals in trade.38 Instead, they planned 
to seize African lands and their other resources and force Afri-
cans to assist them in extracting profits for the benefit of the 
                                                                                                             
 35. SMITH, supra note 17. 
 36. CLAUDE AKE, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA (1981). 
 37. Id. at 19. 
 38. As argued by Crowder, the colonial state maintained armed troops in 
the colony, not for the defense of the territory against external aggression, 
but to control the “native tribes” and enhance the ability of the colonial offic-
ers to maintain peaceful coexistence and help the colonizer’s citizens resident 
in the colony to engage in their economic activities. Michael Crowder, Whose 
Dream Was It Anyway? Twenty-Five Years of African Independence, 86 AFR. 
AFF. 7, 12 (1987). 
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metropolitan economies and the colonists. Take, for example, 
the view expressed by then French Governor of Algeria, Gen-
eral Bugead, in 1841, when he declared that “[w]henever the 
water supply is good and the land fertile, there we must place 
colonists without worrying about previous owners. We must 
distribute the lands [with] full title to the colonists.”39  The 
French, like other European colonizers, used their superior mil-
itary and police force to seize lands belonging to African groups 
and establish their colonies.40 Of course, French settlers were 
not the only ones who viewed force and violence as a legitimate 
way to deal with Africa and Africans. Earl Grey, a well-known 
British colonial officer, summarized the views of his fellow set-
tlers in southern Africa towards African populations when he 
declared that whenever and wherever there was conflict be-
tween English settlers and any African group, especially over 
land, the interests of Africans must be categorically ignored 
and that “facilities should be afforded the white colonist for ob-
taining the possession of land theretofore occupied by the Na-
tive tribes.”41 Throughout this period, the “Native tribes” were 
viewed by the European colonial elites, farmers, planters, min-
ers, prospectors, and missionaries as peoples whose only func-
tion was to serve the interests of the Europeans. To function 
effectively and productively in the new role chosen for them by 
the conquerors, the “Native tribes” had to be converted to Eu-
rope’s brand and concept of Christianity—this was the job of 
the Christian missions. To serve the needs of the European en-
trepreneurial class, Africans had to forsake their customary 
and traditional pursuits and take up wage employment in Eu-
ropean business enterprises, including performing domestic 
services in European households.42 In addition, Africans had to 
                                                                                                             
 39. RICHARD M. BRACE, MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA 48 (1964). 
 40. See generally JENNIFER ELSON SESSIONS, BY SWORD AND PLOW: FRANCE 
AND THE CONQUEST OF ALGERIA (2011) (describing the subjugation of Algeria 
and the establishment of a French colony in Algeria); GEORGE BRENTON 
LAURIE, FRENCH CONQUEST OF ALGERIA (Naval & Military Press 2005) (exam-
ining the establishment of a French colony in Algeria). 
 41. MAGUBANE, supra note 23, at 71. 
 42. During the colonization of Cameroon by Germany and France, for ex-
ample, both European countries actually forced Cameroonians to work for 
enterprises belonging to European planters, farmers, miners, traders, and 
the colonial government. The Germans, who colonized Cameroon before the 
French, imposed a forced labor system on the “native” populations. In order 
to deal with the problem of labor shortages, the German government in the 
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voluntarily give up their lands to the Europeans, or lose them 
through forced alienation.43 Finally, self-actualization for Afri-
cans had to be based on each individual aspiring to achieve the 
European cultural ideal.44 
Professor Fatton describes colonial institutions as primarily 
“structures of exploitation, despotism, and degradation.”45 Con-
sidering that “the colonial state was conceived in violence ra-
                                                                                                             
colony of Kamerun imposed a tax on all native peoples that could only be set-
tled in German marks. On July 1, 1903, the colonial state in Kamerun im-
posed a head tax of 3 marks per year on all men and unmarried women resi-
dent in the colony. As argued by Rudin, “[t]he requirement that every grown 
person, man or unmarried woman, capable of performing work must pay the 
tax shows the connexion of the tax with the labor problem.” If a “native” per-
son was unable to pay the tax, the law prescribed that the offending individ-
ual perform work to cover the amount of the tax. RUDIN, supra note 21, 321–
45. The French used forced labor (corvée) extensively in the construction of 
railroads and the roads linking major cities. According to the French system, 
all males were required by law to provide the colonial government with ten 
days of free labor per year. The French corvée consisted of penal labor, 
prestation labor, and military labor. Of these three, prestation was the most 
economically important. The French imposed a labor tax in Cameroon that 
was similar to the one that had been established by the Germans: all males 
between the ages of 18 and 60 years were forced to pay an annual “tax” under 
which each person was required to provide a minimum of ten days of free 
labor every year. Individuals affected by this tax could pay the colonial gov-
ernment the equivalent of those labor services in currency. Most “natives” 
usually did not have the currency to pay, and hence were forced to work on 
either private or public projects, sometimes for more than ten days. VICTOR T. 
LEVINE, THE CAMEROONS: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE 104–10 (1964). 
See also Mbaku & Kimenyi, supra note 30, at 288. 
 43. For the forced expropriation of African lands by French colonists in 
North Africa, with special emphasis on Algeria, see generally BRACE, supra 
note 39. Consider the statement by French Governor of Algeria, General 
Bugead: “[w]henever the water supply is good and the land fertile, there we 
must place colonists without worrying about previous owners. We must dis-
tribute the lands [with] full title to the colonists.” Also note that similar sen-
timents about the expropriation of lands belonging to African ethnic groups 
were expressed by other colonizers in Africa, including the British. Id. at 48. 
See generally Bernard M. Magubane, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACE AND 
CLASS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1979). 
 44. See generally LEVINE, supra note 42 (examining, inter alia, French 
colonial policy in the U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons under French ad-
ministration; note, especially, France’s policy of association—politique 
d’association). 
 45. Fatton, Jr., supra note 27, at 457. 
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ther than by negotiation,”46 the laws and institutions that facil-
itated this process had to themselves be instruments of vio-
lence. First, the laws were imposed externally by the colonial-
ists without any input from Africans. Second, the laws and in-
stitutions were designed specifically to disenfranchise Africans 
and enhance European control of the colonies. Third, the lan-
guages of the colonial powers were introduced for use in social, 
economic, and political discourse. Fourth, a new religion, 
Christianity, was introduced to replace African traditional reli-
gions. Finally, African ethnic groups were forcefully brought 
together to form easily controlled and administered, economic 
and political units called colonies. 
Given the fact that Europeans were determined to use the co-
ercive apparatus of the state as a tool for the allocation of colo-
nial resources, institutions of law and order, such as the police 
and the judiciary, evolved as instruments of violence to en-
hance the ability of the Europeans to “conquer, control, subju-
gate and exploit Africans.”47 Within each European colony in 
Africa, there were never the types of benevolent public institu-
                                                                                                             
 46. Crowder, Whose Dream, supra note 38, at 11. According to Crowder, 
the level of violence employed by the Europeans to create colonies in Africa 
was often quite extraordinary: “This violence was often quite out of propor-
tion to the task in hand, with burnings of villages, destruction of crops, kill-
ing of women and children, and the execution of leaders. . . . Any form of re-
sistance was visited by punitive expeditions that were often quite unre-
strained by any of the norms of warfare in Europe.” Id. at 11–12. See also 
MICHAEL CROWDER, WEST AFRICA UNDER COLONIAL RULE (Hutchinson 1981) 
(describing the colonial enterprise as it functioned in the West African colo-
nies). 
 47. Mbaku & Kimenyi, supra note 30, at 282–83. Mbaku and Kimenyi ex-
amine the emergence of the police force in the British colony of Nigeria and 
show how it was developed, specifically as an instrument of violence, to en-
hance British exploitation of the resources of the new colony for metropolitan 
development needs. The police force that emerged in the colony of Nigeria, 
they argued, was never a benevolent public institution dedicated to maintain-
ing law and order and ensuring the peace. For a contrary view, see SIR 
CHARLES JEFFRIES, THE COLONIAL POLICE 198–99 (1952). Jeffries argues that 
the colonial police was a benevolent institution whose main function was to 
“act impartially in the interest of the community as a whole, to preserve and 
re-establish the rule of law and order.” Ahire, however, questions Jeffries’ 
assertions, and argues that anyone who sees the colonial police as a “legal 
and constitutional imperative ignores the fact that the police in these [colo-
nies] were established by force, despite indigenous resistance to them.” Philip 
T. Ahire, Policing and the Construction of the Colonial State in Nigeria, 1860–
1960, 7 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 151, 156 (1990). 
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tions that were expected to maintain law and order, and en-
hance the ability of each of the colony’s population groups to 
live together peacefully, maximize their values, and create the 
wealth that they needed to meet their needs.48 Instead, what 
came to characterize governance in the colonies were mainly 
institutions designed to enhance European exploitation, infan-
tilization, and denigration of Africans, all for the benefit of the 
metropolitan economies. 
B. Independence and the Hope for a New Governance Dispensa-
tion 
Independence was expected to grant Africans several bene-
fits, the most important of which was the “opportunity to rid 
themselves of not only the Europeans, but also of their laws 
and institutions and then, develop and adopt, through a demo-
cratic process—specifically, a people-driven, bottom-up, partic-
ipatory, and transparent institutional reform process—
institutional arrangements based on their own values, aspira-
tions, traditions, and customs.”49 The hope of the African mass-
es, who during colonialism had been subjected to horrendous 
violence, “‘infantilized[,]’ stigmatized by their color, and with 
no recognizable rights,”50 was that the new post-independence 
laws and institutions would provide the wherewithal for peace-
ful coexistence of each new country’s diverse population groups, 
restore their fundamental rights, and create opportunities for 
self-actualization. This would provide an enabling environment 
for the development and nurturing of an indigenous entrepre-
neurial class to create the wealth needed to confront mass pov-
erty. New post-independence institutions were also expected to 
adequately constrain civil servants and political elites, so that 
they would serve only the national interests and not engage in 
                                                                                                             
 48. Robert Peel, who created the modern police force in the United King-
dom, considered the police a benevolent institution whose main function was 
to prevent crime and suppress evil. See CHARLES REITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF 
THE BRITISH POLICE 109 (1948) (discussing, inter alia, Peel’s creation of the 
force and crediting “the unique relationship with the public which the police 
have created and are at constant pains to maintain” as the “basic secret of 
the success and efficiency of the British police.”). See also ERIC J. EVANS, SIR 
ROBERT PEEL: STATESMANSHIP, POWER AND PARTY (1991). 
 49. Mbaku & Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in Africa’s “New” Global Era, 
in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA, supra note 3, at 2. 
 50. Fatton, Jr., supra note 27, at 458 (semicolon omitted). 
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corruption, rent seeking, and other forms of opportunism to il-
legally secure income and wealth for themselves.51 
The post-colonial state was expected, by its citizens, to devote 
all its policies to national integration, nation building, and the 
improvement of the welfare of all citizens. These were the is-
sues that gave impetus to the decolonization project—the need 
to rid the colonies of the Europeans and their opportunistic pol-
icies, and hand over the apparatus of government to Africans 
who would then spearhead the effort to develop and modernize 
the new countries. To accomplish these objectives, government 
would be “controlled and directed not by center elites and their 
[foreign] benefactors, but by popular forces with significant al-
lowance made for the full and effective participation of the rel-
evant stakeholder groups—those whose lives would be gov-
erned or affected by these institutions.”52 
Unfortunately, this view of the post-colonial state was shared 
primarily by the masses who were not in a position to effect the 
changes necessary to produce development-oriented and consti-
tutionally-limited states. This is evidenced by the types of be-
haviors in which the continent’s post-independence bureau-
crats and political elites preferred to engage. In the post-
independence period, corruption and rent seeking had become 
endemic in virtually all African countries. Most of these oppor-
tunistic activities represented efforts by ruling elites to subvert 
national laws to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of 
the people. Given the fact that such elites approached decoloni-
zation and independence as an opportunity for them to capture 
the evacuated structures of colonial hegemony, and use them to 
redistribute income and wealth in their favor, they did not 
make any effort to ensure that the critical domains were 
properly transformed; nor did they insist on democratic consti-
tution-making either in the pre- or post-independence period.53 
                                                                                                             
 51. Mbaku & Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in Africa’s “New” Global Era, 
in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 2. 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. For example, during the struggle for independence in the U.N. Trust 
Territory of Cameroons under French administration, many of the territory’s 
political elites, including Ahmadou Ahidjo, who became the country’s first 
president, were willing to forego any efforts at state reconstruction and insti-
tutional development (i.e., they were willing to postpone effective constitu-
tion-making) and gain independence. See generally MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 119. The hope was that once independence 
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In fact, all of the former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa 
except Guinea accepted the offer made by the then French 
president, Charles de Gaulle, of free association as autonomous 
republics within the French Community (Communauté fran-
çaise), and as a consequence, did not engage their populations 
in democratic constitution-making, choosing instead to use the 
French Constitution of 1958 as the foundation for their laws 
and institutions. Such a process effectively deprived the citi-
zens of the francophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa of the 
opportunity and right to select their own laws and governance 
institutions.54 
In each new country, the law was supposed to help Africans 
organize their private lives, provide them with mechanisms to 
peacefully resolve conflicts arising from sociopolitical interac-
tion, including those from trade and other forms of exchange, 
and adequately constrain the state so that its custodians—
namely, civil servants and political elites—could not behave 
with impunity. Instead, what they got were various forms of 
laws and institutions inherited from the colonial state, all of 
which were incapable of promoting law and order and provid-
ing the enabling environment for the creation of wealth. These 
                                                                                                             
was achieved and governance structures were in the hands of indigenous 
elites, the latter would engage the people in democratic constitution-making 
to produce appropriate—namely, democratic—institutional arrangements for 
governance. That, unfortunately, never happened. In fact, in the case of 
Cameroon, the 1960 Constitution, which was based on the Constitution of the 
French Fifth Republic and whose compacting did not involve any robust con-
stitutional discourse, remains the foundation of the country’s 1972, 1996, and 
2008 constitutions. The latter is the country’s present constitution. Through-
out its existence as a sovereign country, Cameroon has never undertaken 
democratic constitution-making. Instead, the country’s political elites have 
engaged in opportunistic institutional “reforms” to produce laws and institu-
tions that have allowed them to monopolize the supply of legislation and ef-
fectively plunder the national economy for their own benefit. See generally 
LEVINE, supra note 42. 
 54. LeVine questions the “appropriateness of modeling the Cameroun con-
stitution so closely on that of the [French] Fifth Republic.” Although France’s 
1958 Constitution—the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic—was de-
signed “in the context of the constitutional crisis that brought De Gaulle to 
power,” the “circumstances surrounding the writing of the Cameroun consti-
tution were not in any way analogous to those existing in France in 1958.” 
LEVINE, supra note 42, at 224–27. See also Victor T. LeVine, The Fall and 
Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa, 35 J. MOD. AFR. ST. 181, 184–85 
(1997) [hereinafter LeVine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism]. 
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laws and institutions, after all, were instruments of oppression 
used by the Europeans during the colonial period to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the inhabitants of the colonies. 
The African elites who captured the apparatus of government 
at independence turned these same European-inspired laws 
and institutions into instruments of plunder, and proceeded to 
use them to oppress and infantilize the masses as well as en-
rich themselves, just as the Europeans had done.55 
C. The Policy Imperative in Africa Today 
While African countries currently face a plethora of problems, 
the most important are how to (1) manage ethnic and religious 
diversity and provide for peaceful coexistence; (2) create the 
wealth that these countries need to deal with poverty and im-
prove national living standards; (3) establish entrepreneurial 
sectors capable of providing a solid foundation for economic 
growth and development; (4) minimize corruption, rent seek-
ing, financial malfeasance—particularly in the public sector—
and deal effectively with other forms of political opportunism, 
which have emerged as important constraints to governance 
and economic transformation; (5) promote the protection of 
fundamental and human rights; and (6) significantly improve 
the continent’s participation in the international economy and 
global affairs. 
One can argue that for Africa to effectively and fully deal 
with these problems requires the cooperation of the interna-
tional community. That may be true, especially given the influ-
ence of international organizations such as the World Bank56 
                                                                                                             
 55. As argued by Fatton, “The rapid disintegration of the inherited par-
liamentary model generated the rise of personal rule shaped by the idiosyn-
crasies of the ruler and his entourage rather than by effective political insti-
tutions and regulations.” In fact, most of the inherited political systems in 
Africa degenerated shortly after independence into authoritarian systems 
that effectively allowed the ruling elites to create and use patron-client net-
works for resource extraction and self-enrichment. Fatton, Jr., supra note 27, 
at 459–60. 
 56. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (also 
called the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) are 
generally referred to as the Bretton Woods Institutions because they were 
founded at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States, in 1944. While 
the IMF’s main mission was to ensure that global trade was not interrupted 
and to provide financial assistance to countries to deal with temporary bal-
ance of payments problems, the World Bank was tasked with promoting eco-
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and International Monetary Fund,57 as well as the developed 
market economies of the West, which, along with their multi-
national companies, continue to dominate investment in the 
African countries. Additionally, in recent years, the PRC58 has 
significantly increased its involvement and influence in the Af-
rican economies. However, effective economic, political, and so-
cial development in Africa requires that Africans take owner-
ship of their problems and seek appropriate ways to deal with 
them. They must recognize that eliminating poverty in the con-
tinent and significantly improving the living standards of the 
people must be based on and informed by full participation of 
all Africans in the policy design and implementation process. 
Africans cannot rely on the benevolence of external actors in 
order to realize the solutions to these problems. Specifically, 
each African country must engage its citizens in the process of 
state reconstruction to provide institutional arrangements that 
                                                                                                             
nomic growth and development in the post-World War II period, primarily in 
the poor and developing countries that emerged from colonial rule in the post-
war period. The IMF has been involved in many projects in Africa. The most 
important of them have been the structural adjustment programs (“SAPs”), 
which were designed to enhance the ability of African countries to service 
their external debts and improve macroeconomic performance. See generally 
MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 141–75 (discussing, 
among other things, the impact of the IMF’s structural adjustment programs 
on economic development in Africa in the mid-1980s and early 1990s); Kevin 
Danaher, Introduction, in 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD 
BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1, 2 (Kevin Danaher ed., 
1994) (arguing that despite the fact that the Bretton Woods institutions were 
given clear and well-defined mandates, they nevertheless proceeded to pur-
sue other objectives, which included trying to integrate economies of the de-
veloping countries into the “capitalist world economy”); STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (Kempe Ronald 
Hope, Sr. ed., 1997) (arguing that the approach to development and balance-
of-trade adjustment taken by the World Bank and the IMF is not appropriate 
for the African countries). The World Bank is a major supporter of economic 
development in Africa. In 2010, the Bank committed US$11.5 billion in loans 
to development projects in Africa. See News Release, World Bank Group, Un-
precedented Support from the World Bank to Help Africa Recover from the 
Crisis (July 1, 2010). 
 57. See Danaher, supra note 56; MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 1, at 161–63. 
 58. CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 
World Peace Foundation 2008) (examining the emerging relationship be-
tween the People’s Republic of China and Africa, especially in the areas of 
trade, development aid, and political influence). 
2013] RULE OF LAW 981 
(1) can enhance the effective management of ethnic and reli-
gious diversity, as well as ensure the peaceful coexistence of all 
population groups; (2) establish and maintain a fully function-
ing private sector, which will create the wealth that is needed 
to deal with mass poverty and help eradicate poverty; (3) min-
imize all forms of political opportunism, especially corruption, 
rent seeking, and public financial malfeasance, all of which are 
major constraints to economic growth and wealth creation; (4) 
ensure that the people’s fundamental and human rights are 
constitutionally guaranteed and fully protected; and (5) en-
hance Africa’s participation in and influence on international 
trade and global affairs. 
While the objectives of this research have already been stat-
ed, it is important to note two things. First, that this paper 
calls attention to the need for Africans to revisit existing ap-
proaches to wealth creation and economic growth, as well as 
poverty alleviation and eventual eradication in Africa. And sec-
ond, this paper shows that while international cooperation is 
important for success in fighting poverty and improving living 
conditions on the continent, Africans must recognize that in-
ternational support—for example, through foreign investment, 
development aid, and grants—is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition. Sufficiency mandates that each African country pro-
vide itself with institutional arrangements that guarantee the 
rule of law. Thus, part of Africa’s effort to eliminate poverty 
and enhance human development must involve the develop-
ment, through a democratic constitution-making process, of in-
stitutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law. 
As mentioned earlier, this study employs a constitutional po-
litical economy model, which posits that rules59 have a signifi-
cant influence on and to a great extent determine outcomes re-
sulting from sociopolitical interaction in any society. Constitu-
tional political economy deals with the rules that constrain the 
“economic and political relationships among persons” within a 
country or community.60 Laws and institutions provide indi-
viduals living in a society with the wherewithal to organize 
their private lives and maximize their values—for example, by 
                                                                                                             
 59. The eighteenth century Scottish social philosopher and pioneering po-
litical economist, Adam Smith, called these rules, “laws and institutions.” See 
SMITH, supra note 17, at 106. 
 60. BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 18, at 7. 
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engaging in mutually beneficial exchanges or undertaking en-
trepreneurial activities to create the wealth that they need. 
These institutions function within a context in which they do 
not constrain or prevent others from achieving their own objec-
tives.61 Brennan and Buchanan argue that in enhancing the 
ability of individuals to maximize their interests, rules also 
serve the “negative function of preventing disastrous harm.”62 
Throughout the continent, Africans are confronted with gov-
ernmental systems that exploit, denigrate, pauperize, and in-
fantilize them. Part of the problem comes from the fact that 
many Africans live in countries or societies with rules that they 
either do not understand, or the existence of which they are not 
aware.63 In many African countries, only a select group of indi-
viduals, primarily urban-based elites who control the govern-
ment, take part in the selection of the laws and are familiar 
with them. These ruling elites regularly subvert the laws to 
redistribute income and wealth in their favor. In the process, 
they violate the fundamental human rights of their fellow citi-
zens.64 Effective laws, those that enhance peaceful coexistence 
and promote wealth creation, are those that adequately con-
strain the state and prevent civil servants and political elites 
from engaging in the various forms of opportunism, such as 
rent seeking, corruption, and financial malfeasance. Of course, 
the majority of citizens must voluntarily accept and respect 
these laws; otherwise, policing to enforce compliance would be 
a very difficult and odious task.65 For most citizens to accept 
                                                                                                             
 61. Id. at 14. 
 62. Id. 
 63. For example, throughout the continent, many poor people are regularly 
denied access to services at public hospitals because they are not able to pay 
the bribes demanded by doctors, nurses, and other hospital staff. This takes 
place despite the fact that there are laws against such conduct by staff at 
public institutions, including hospitals. Of course, civil servants are able to 
easily act with impunity because existing laws do not adequately constrain 
them. See MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 87–116 (examining 
corruption and its impact on African economies). 
 64. See, e.g., MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA, supra note 1 
(examining, inter alia, the monopolization of the supply of legislation by cen-
ter elites and the impact of that approach to institutional reforms on African 
economies). 
 65. Of course, not all citizens have to voluntarily accept and respect the 
law. The critical point is that in order to enhance policing, it is important 
that a majority of citizens voluntarily accept and respect the law. The minori-
ty that does not can be dealt with and forced to comply by the country’s coun-
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and respect the laws, the laws must reflect their values, cus-
toms, and traditions, their aspirations, interests, and 
worldview, and must be relevant to the problems that they 
must deal with on a regular basis, providing them with neces-
sary tools to organize their private lives. Such laws and institu-
tions can only be produced through a bottom-up, participatory, 
inclusive, and people-driven institutional reform process. 
The creation of the wealth that is needed to confront poverty 
and improve the living standards of Africans requires that each 
country develop and adopt institutional arrangements that 
guarantee the rule of law. This study will examine the ele-
ments of the rule of law and show its relevance to the creation 
of wealth, and hence, the minimization of poverty in Africa. 
II. THE RULE OF LAW 
A. Introduction 
Throughout history, legal philosophers have worked hard to 
define the concept called the “rule of law.” British jurist and 
legal philosopher Albert Venn Dicey is credited with providing 
the logical foundation on which the modern definition of the 
concept of the rule of law is based. He argued that the rule of 
law must embody three important concepts: first, the law is su-
preme; second, all citizens are equal before the law; and third, 
a recognition and acceptance of the principle that the rights of 
individuals must be established through court decisions.66 
On November 16, 2006, the Rt. Hon. Lord Bingham of Corn-
hill KG delivered the sixth lecture in honor of Sir David Wil-
liams at the Center for Public Law, University of Cambridge, 
titled “The Rule of Law.”67 In that lecture, Lord Bingham stat-
ed that “all persons and authorities within the state, whether 
public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit 
                                                                                                             
teracting agencies, such as the police and the court system. Voluntary com-
pliance significantly minimizes the costs of policing and is extremely im-
portant for the African countries because they have limited resources to de-
vote to enforcement. See MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 13–
14. 
 66. ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 179–201 (Macmillan 1959) (1885). 
 67. Thomas Bingham, Rt. Hon. Lord, House of Lords, Sixth Sir David Wil-
liams Lecture: The Rule of Law (Nov. 2006), available at 
http://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/Media/THE%20OF%LAW%2006.pdf. 
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of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly 
administered in the courts.”68 He set out eight sub-rules, which 
he argued underlie the general principle of the rule of law. 
These sub-rules are: 
1. “the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligi-
ble, clear and predictable”; 
2. “questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be 
resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of dis-
cretion”; 
3. “the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the 
extent that objective differences justify differentiation”; 
4. “the law must afford adequate protection of fundamental 
human rights”; 
5. “means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive 
cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the 
parties themselves are unable to resolve”; 
6. “ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the 
powers conferred on them reasonably, in good faith, for the 
purpose for which the powers were conferred and without ex-
ceeding the limits of such powers”; 
7. “that adjudicative procedures provided by the state should 
be fair”; and 
8. “the existing principle of the rule of law requires compli-
ance by the state with its obligations in international law, the 
law which whether deriving from treaty or international cus-
tom and practice governs the conduct of nations.”69 
In a 2009 article, Professor Stein70 argued that the most im-
portant aspect of Lord Bingham’s definition of the rule of law is 
that “the law is superior, applies equally, is known and pre-
dictable, and is administered through a separation of powers.”71 
Professor Stein then goes on to provide his own definition of the 
rule of law. He argues that a country governed by institutional 
arrangements that guarantee the rule of law is characterized 
by the following: 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. at 5. 
 69. Id. at 6–29. 
 70. Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does It Mean? 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 293 
(2009). 
 71. Id. at 301. 
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1. The law is superior to all members of society, including 
government officials vested with either executive, legislative, 
or judicial power. 
2. The law is known, stable, and predictable. Laws are ap-
plied equally to all persons in like circumstances. Laws are 
sufficiently defined and government discretion sufficiently 
limited to ensure the law is applied non-arbitrarily. 
3. Members of society have the right to participate in the cre-
ation and refinement of laws that regulate their behaviors. 
4. The law is just and protects the human rights and dignity 
of all members of society. Legal processes are sufficiently ro-
bust and accessible to ensure enforcement of these protections 
by an independent legal profession. 
5. Judicial power is exercised independently of either the ex-
ecutive or legislative powers and individual judges base their 
decisions solely on facts and law of individual cases.72 
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) has also shown an in-
terest not only in tackling the issue of defining the rule of law, 
but also in helping promote its implementation outside the 
United States. The ABA has taken a leadership role in the 
movement to help transition countries reform, transform, and 
reconstitute their legal systems. Finding a workable definition 
for the rule of law is part of that effort.73 The ABA, however, 
argues that “[t]he rule of law does not depend upon a U.S.-style 
separation of powers. . . . The key point is that every form of 
government has to have some system to ensure that no one in 
the government has so much power that they can act above the 
law.”74 The rule of law consists of several elements, but the 
most important of them, especially in Africa where bureaucrat-
ic corruption has become endemic and political elites and civil 
servants behave with impunity, is that no one, not even the 
people who hold leadership positions in government, including 
the executive, judiciary officers, and legislators, is above the 
law—the law is supreme. 
                                                                                                             
 72. Id. at 302. 
 73. See A.B.A. Division of Public Education, Dialogue on the Rule of Law 
Part I: What is the Rule of Law?, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/dialoguesruleoflaw.htm
l (last visited Apr. 24, 2013). 
 74. Id. at 4. 
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Joseph Raz, who studied legal philosophy at Oxford Universi-
ty under H. L. A. Hart, and later became a Professor of Philos-
ophy of Law at Oxford, provided a definition for the rule of law 
that encapsulates eight basic guiding principles, namely: 
1. All laws should be prospective, open, and clear. 
2. Laws should be relatively stable. 
3. The making of particular laws (particular legal orders) 
should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules. 
4. The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed. 
5. The principles of natural justice must be observed. 
6. The courts should have review powers over the implemen-
tation of the other principles. 
7. The courts should be easily accessible. 
8. The discretion of crime-preventing agencies should not be 
allowed to pervert the law.75 
Law Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, a well-known expert on 
constitutional law, argues that although he agrees with the 
guiding principles advanced by Professor Raz, he nevertheless 
believes that these principles “do not really provide much guid-
ance.” 76  According to Chemerinsky, “Raz’s idea that laws 
should be relatively stable gives no indication of when it is ap-
propriate to change laws, whether by overruling precedent or 
revising statutes.”77 He argued further that in order to formu-
late a practical and workable definition for the rule of law, one 
must consider or address a specific set of propositions. These 
are: 
1. The rule of law requires the formation of general laws ac-
cording to set procedures. 
2. Laws must be general, prospective, and clearly stated. 
3. The government must obey the laws in its actions. 
4. Government must not infringe the rights of individuals. 
                                                                                                             
 75. Erwin Chemerinsky, Toward a Practical Definition of the Rule of Law, 
46 JUDGES J. 4, 5 (2007) (quoting Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 
in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3–21 (Robert L. Cunningham ed., 1979)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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5. The government must follow fair procedures in depriving a 
person of life, liberty, or property. 
6. The government must treat likes alike and unalikes una-
like. 
7. The government must provide a fair system to resolve pri-
vate disputes. 
8. An independent judiciary is essential to the rule of law.78 
In recent years, the United Nations has also become interest-
ed and involved in the movement to formulate a definition for 
the rule of law. According to the U.N., 
[t]he ‘rule of law’ refers to a principle of governance in which 
all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, in-
cluding the State itself, are accountable to laws that are pub-
licly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudi-
cated, and which are consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to 
ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equal-
ity before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the 
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness 
and procedural and legal transparency.79 
For most countries around the world, including the highly 
developed democracies, the rule of law is an ideal that they 
hope and seek to achieve, but it is not unusual to find highly 
advanced democracies that are struggling to guarantee the rule 
of law within their legal systems. The American Republic—the 
United States of America—which came into being in 1776, was 
governed for many years by a constitution that failed to protect 
the fundamental and human rights of all its citizens. Although 
the new country’s constitution was specifically designed to pro-
tect the rights of its citizens, slavery was widely practiced 
throughout most of the country. In fact, the U.S. Constitution 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 6–9. 
 79. Robert H. Wagstaff, The Aftermath of Terrorism: Rule of Law Applies 
to Detainees in U.S. and U.K., 12 Alaska B. Rag 24, 24 (2010) (quoting U.N. 
Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies, ¶6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616.23 (Aug. 2004)). 
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expressly sanctioned the institution of slavery—slavery and the 
slave trade were legal in the United States until 1808.80 
B. The Elements of the Rule of Law 
The heart of the rule of law is that “the government must 
obey the law in its actions.”81 This view flows directly from the 
belief that the law is supreme. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 
Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, has stated that 
“[t]he Law rests upon known, general principles applicable on 
equal terms to all persons. It follows that the Law is superior 
to, and thus binds, the government and all of its officials.”82 
The supremacy of law is the first element of law that is identi-
fied for the purposes of this article. 
A country is not likely to be able to “maintain the rule of law 
if its citizens do not [accept] and respect the law.”83 If, in a 
country, the majority of citizens do not accept and respect the 
law, it would be very difficult for the government agencies 
whose job it is to maintain law and order to successfully per-
form their duties. Policing for compliance, for example, would 
be extremely costly and the government would likely be forced 
to devote a significant portion of national income to compliance 
activities, a process that can reduce expenditures on important 
sectors of the economy such as health and human capital de-
velopment. Hence, the second element of the rule of law is that 
the majority of citizens must accept and respect the law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has contributed significantly to the 
development of modern rule of law jurisprudence. In United 
States v. United Mine Workers,84 a case that was decided in 
1947, the U.S. Supreme Court held that: 
In our country law is not a body of technicalities in the keep-
ing of specialists or in the service of any special interest. 
There can be no free society without law administered 
through an independent judiciary. If one man can be allowed 
                                                                                                             
 80. U.S. CONST, art. I, §9. Slavery was eventually abolished in the United 
States and the country’s Constitution was duly amended to afford descend-
ants of slaves equal protection under the law. 
 81. Chemerinsky, supra note 75, at 6. 
 82. Stein, supra note 70, at 299 (quoting Anthony M. Kennedy, Written 
Constitutions and the Common Law Tradition, 20th Sultan Azlan Shah Law 
Lecture in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 11 (Aug. 10, 2006)). 
 83. A.B.A. Division of Education, supra note 73, at 5. 
 84. U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
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to determine for himself what is law, every man can. That 
means first chaos, then tyranny.85 
Many of the definitions of the rule of law proffered by various 
scholars, and examined above, share the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
assertion in United States v. United Mine Workers 86  that 
“[t]here can be no free society without law administered 
through an independent judiciary.”87 For example, among Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky’s eight key propositions to be addressed in 
an effort to formulate a practical definition for the rule of law 
is: “An independent judiciary is essential to the rule of law.”88 
In arguing that “[t]he ‘rule of law’ refers to a principle of gov-
ernance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public 
or private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws 
that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and inde-
pendently adjudicated, . . .”, 89  the United Nations also 
acknowledges judicial independence as an essential and critical 
element of the rule of law. 
Thus, the third element of the rule of law is judicial inde-
pendence. In many African countries, even where the constitu-
tion specifically makes allowances for separation of powers and 
guarantees judicial independence, the judiciary is still subject 
to, or controlled by, the executive branch of government. In 
many of these countries, the executive employs the judiciary as 
an instrument to control citizens and enhance the regime’s 
ability to monopolize power. Little emphasis is placed on the 
administration of justice.90 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 312. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Chemerinsky, supra note 75, at 8. 
 89. Wagstaff, supra note 79, at 33 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, The 
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 
¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616.23 (Aug. 2004). 
 90. Consider the case of the Republic of Cameroon. According to the coun-
try’s constitution—Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 2008—judiciary 
independence is expressly guaranteed. However, the same constitution vests 
the president of the republic with the power to guarantee the independence of 
the judiciary. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, arts. 37(2), 37(3). 
Cameroon, of course, is not the only country in Africa with such an approach 
to “judiciary independence.” According to Article 69 of the Gabonese Consti-
tution, “La Président de la République est le garant de l’indépendance du 
pouvoir judicaire.” (“The President of the Republic is the guarantor of the 
independence of the judiciary.”) CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE GABONAISE, 
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Law functions effectively only if citizens are aware of, under-
stand, and appreciate the law. Governments can help citizens 
understand and appreciate the law through broad-based educa-
tion programs undertaken at schools and in community-based 
adult education centers. Such programs, however, should only 
be designed to supplement, but not replace, participatory and 
inclusive constitution-making. First, citizens must be provided 
the facilities to participate fully and effectively in constitution-
making. Second, the enactment of laws in the post-
constitutional society should be open and transparent, making 
allowances for as much participation as possible. Finally, the 
“laws [must be] applied predictably and uniformly,”91 and not 
capriciously or arbitrarily. The fourth and fifth elements of the 
rule of law are openness and transparency, and predictability. 
According to the ABA, as a legal principle, the rule of law de-
veloped in the United States “around the belief that a primary 
purpose of the rule of law is the protection of certain basic 
rights.”92 In similar fashion, the decolonization projects of the 
1950s and 1960s in Africa were based on the desire of Africans, 
first, to rid themselves of the European-induced laws and insti-
tutions, and, second, to replace them with institutional ar-
rangements designed by Africans themselves. The hope was 
that each country would develop and adopt laws and institu-
tions that would enhance the ability of its diverse citizens to 
live together peacefully and create wealth to deal with poverty 
and improve living conditions.93 Such post-independence insti-
                                                                                                             
art. 69 (last amended by Law No. 13/2003 of August 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7439 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2013). Similarly, Article 89 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Mauritania states that “Le pouvoir judiciaire est indépendant du pouvoir 
législatif et du pouvoir exécutif. Le Président de la République est garant de 
l’indépendance de la Magistrature.” (“The judiciary is independent of the leg-
islative and executive branches. The President of the Republic shall guaran-
tee the independence of the judiciary.”) CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA, art. 89, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7436 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2013). In fact, virtually all the constitutions of the former French colonies in 
Africa assign to the executive the job of guaranteeing judicial independence. 
 91. A.B.A. Division of Public Education, supra note 73, at 5. 
 92. Id. 
 93. In a 1987 paper, Michael Crowder examined political economy in Nige-
ria as just one example of a country that failed to live up to the hopes of its 
citizens and those who believed that the new state would use its independ-
ence to provide structures capable of enhancing peaceful coexistence and sus-
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tutional arrangements were expected to adequately constrain 
the state, effectively preventing civil servants and political 
elites from engaging in corruption, rent seeking, and other 
forms of opportunism; and to guarantee the protection of fun-
damental and human rights, as well as provide citizens with 
the wherewithal for self-actualization. Of course, the new laws 
and institutions were also expected to adequately constrain 
non-state actors so that they could not infringe on the rights of 
their fellow citizens, especially those who had historically been 
marginalized and abused, such as women, and ethnic and reli-
gious minorities.94 
Instead, constitution-making in the pre- and post-
independence periods was elite-driven, top-down, and non-
participatory.95 The outcome of such a rules selection process 
                                                                                                             
tainable development. Crowder states that he chose Nigeria “as an example 
of the disillusion that has attended the first twenty-five years of independ-
ence not only among the former colonial rulers who transferred power but 
also among those who inherited that power, because it contains a quarter of 
the population of the African continent. Its experience has unhappily not 
been atypical but rather the norm for the majority of African countries.” 
Crowder, Whose Dream, supra note 38, at 8. 
 94. See Mbaku & Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in Africa’s Political Ad-
justment in the “New” Global Era, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 1–2 (arguing that “[m]any Africans, especially 
the historically marginalized and deprived (e.g., women, rural inhabitants, 
ethnic minorities, and those forced to live on the urban periphery), believed 
that independence was an opportunity to rid themselves of not only the Eu-
ropeans, but also of their laws and institutions and then, develop and adopt, 
through a democratic process—a people-driven, bottom-up, participatory, and 
transparent institutional reform process—institutional arrangements based 
on their own values, aspirations, traditions, and customs”). 
 95. In the French colonies, for example, constitution-making degenerated 
into the adoption of the constitutional platform offered to these colonies by 
General Charles de Gaulle. It was only Guinea that voted against de Gaulle’s 
offer of association as autonomous political units within the French Commu-
nity. In British colonies, constitution-making was carried out primarily in 
London and away from the people—the African peoples were represented by 
urban-based African elites, many of whom were actually chosen by the colo-
nial government, instead of by the people. In the colonies with significant 
populations of settlers, the settlers dominated and sometimes controlled con-
stitution-making. See, e.g., LeVine, supra note 42, at 183–85 (examining con-
stitution-making in the U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons under French 
administration); DENNIS V. COWEN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM: WITH 
REFERENCE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA 43–82 (1961) (providing insight into consti-
tutional discourse in the colonies that united in 1910 to form the Union of 
South Africa). 
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was institutional arrangements that failed to adequately con-
strain the state and did not provide each new country’s diverse 
population groups with the mechanisms for peaceful coexist-
ence. Specifically, these post-independence laws and institu-
tions, especially in the francophone countries, created so-called 
imperial presidencies with power concentrated in the center, 
and failed to protect the fundamental and human rights of citi-
zens.96 Thus, the sixth element of the rule of law is the protec-
tion of the fundamental rights of citizens. 
III. THE RULE OF LAW AS A FOUNDATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN 
AFRICA: OVERVIEW 
A. Introduction 
The struggle against poverty and deprivation in Africa is ac-
tually a fight to create wealth—that is, a fight to establish 
within each country viable and fully functioning entrepreneur-
ial communities. With increased wealth, and given the appro-
priate institutional environment, Africans can invest in human 
development. The additional resources can be used to increase 
spending on nutrition, especially for infants and children; edu-
cation, especially at the primary and secondary levels; clean 
water; women’s health, especially on prenatal care; and the so-
cial overhead capital that is needed to enhance each country’s 
ability to create more wealth. 
Fighting poverty and improving living conditions, especially 
for historically marginalized groups and communities,97 are the 
most important public policy priorities for African countries. 
During most of the post-independence period, African countries 
have relied heavily on resource flows from abroad, especially in 
the form of official development assistance, as well as food aid, 
to deal with poverty and poverty-related problems.98 The most 
                                                                                                             
 96. See, e.g., H. Kwasi Prempeh, Presidential Power in Comparative Per-
spective: The Puzzling Persistence of Imperial Presidency in Post-
Authoritarian Africa, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761, 806 (2008); LeVine, The 
Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism, supra note 54, at 196; LEVINE, supra note 
42, at 224–27. 
 97. Such groups and communities include women, infants and children, 
rural inhabitants, the urban poor, and ethnic and religious minorities. 
 98. For a critique of foreign aid’s effectiveness as a tool for the fight 
against poverty, see Doug Bandow, The Fallacy of Foreign Assistance Pro-
grams as Instruments of Economic Growth and Social Stability: The Case of 
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effective way for Africans to deal with poverty, especially on a 
sustainable basis, is for each economy to significantly improve 
its capacity to create wealth. That capacity includes, and is de-
pendent significantly on, the existence within each country of 
institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law.99 
B. The Supremacy of Law 
By far the most important obstacles to the creation of wealth 
and improvement of the human condition in Africa are bureau-
cratic and political corruption, rent seeking, public financial 
malfeasance, and other forms of opportunism perpetuated by 
civil servants and political elites, usually in an effort to extract 
extra-legal income for themselves and their benefactors. Dur-
ing the last several decades, these behaviors have become en-
demic in many African countries.100 These growth-inhibiting 
                                                                                                             
the United States, 10 BUS. & CONT. WORLD 171, 173 (1998); PERPETUATING 
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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2011, at 111 (2011). 
 99. For recent examinations of the rule of law in Africa, see Eric C. Chris-
tiansen, Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa: Creative Uses of 
Constitutional Court Authority to Advance Substantive Justice, 13 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUST. 575 (2010); David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial 
Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 319, 369–77 
(2010); PEACEBUILDING AND RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA: JUST PEACE? (C.L. Sri-
ram, Olga Martin-Ortega & Johanna Herman eds., Routledge 2011); Robert 
Coniglio, Note: Methods of Judicial Decision-Making and the Rule of Law: 
The Case of Apartheid South Africa, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 497 (2012). 
 100. The Berlin-based Transparency International (“TI”) monitors percep-
tions of corruption around the world. According to TI’s Corruption Percep-
tions Index (CPI) for 2011, for example, most of the corrupt countries in the 
world are found in Africa. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTIONS 
PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2011, at 4 (2011). See also MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, 
supra note 1, at 37–86 (examining the pervasiveness of corruption in the Af-
rican economies); Charles M. Fombad, Endemic Corruption in Cameroon: 
Insights on Consequences and Control, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 234 (Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. 
& Bornwell C. Chikulo eds., 2000) (examining the endemic nature of corrup-
tion on various African economies and its impact on growth and develop-
ment). 
994 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:3 
behaviors have actually stunted the emergence of the type of 
productive—that is, private—sector capable of producing 
enough wealth to meet the needs of the people. In fact, corrup-
tion remains a very serious obstacle to entrepreneurship, espe-
cially among historically marginalized and deprived groups. 
The pervasiveness of corruption and other forms of political op-
portunism in the African countries is due to the fact that the 
laws and institutions that emerged in these countries in the 
post-independence period did not adequately constrain the 
state, allowing civil servants and political elites to act with im-
punity. Specifically, the constitutions of these countries did not 
guarantee the supremacy of law, nor did they provide mecha-
nisms, such as the separation of powers, to realize those guar-
antees in practice. As a consequence, there were no viable and 
effective mechanisms available to citizens to adequately check 
the excesses of the government.101 
                                                                                                             
 101. MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 156–64. In the imme-
diate post-independence period, military officers in some African countries 
argued that they could remedy what they believed was an untenable political 
and economic situation and significantly improve governance. Specifically, 
they argued that the military, built on a foundation and tradition of disci-
pline, was the only institution capable of bringing warring ethnic and reli-
gious groups together and securing the peace, as well as ridding the public 
sector of opportunistic and recalcitrant civil servants and politicians, and 
establishing a professional, efficient, and fully functioning bureaucracy in 
each country. For example, the leaders of the military coup that brought Ni-
geria’s First Republic to an end argued that they intervened to rid the coun-
try of dishonest, incompetent and corrupt civil servants and politicians, and 
“restore respectability to the Nigerian civil service.” MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS 
AND REFORM IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 123. In an address to the nation 
shortly after the January 15, 1966 coup that brought the military to power, 
Major Chukuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, the coup’s leader, identified the following 
as the people who had destroyed the country and whose removal from office 
was critical for the maintenance of an efficient and viable bureaucracy: “polit-
ical profiteers, swindlers, the men in the high and low places that seek bribes 
and demand ten percent, those that seek to keep the country divided perma-
nently so that they can remain in office as ministers and V.I.P.’s of waste, the 
tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing be-
fore international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the 
Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds.” Pita Ogaba 
Agbese, With Fingers on the Trigger: The Military as Custodian of Democracy 
in Nigeria, 9 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 220, 227 (1992). Between 1966 and 1999, 
Nigeria was ruled primarily by military elites, virtually all of whom came 
into power through extra-constitutional means. Each group of military lead-
ers that seized the apparatus of government repeated Maj. Nzeogwu’s proc-
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In the 1920s, John Dickinson studied administrative tribu-
nals and common-law courts in the United States, and conclud-
ed that the law serves as an important mechanism for citizens 
to check the exercise of government agency.102 The ability of 
citizens to adequately check on the government is critical for 
the maintenance of the rule of law. As argued by British legal 
philosopher Albert Dicey,103 the rule of law comprises “firstly, 
the supremacy of law as opposed to arbitrariness or even wide 
discretion by governments; second, the equality of all persons 
before the law; and third, in England, principles establishing 
the rights of individuals developed by case law through centu-
ries in that country.”104 Both Dicey and the many legal scholars 
and practitioners that came after him, especially in the Anglo-
American spheres of influence, believed that in order for the 
rule of law to exist in a country, all citizens, including those 
who serve in government, must be subject to laws agreed upon 
in an earlier period. Under such a legal regime, the country’s 
citizens, whether they are members of the government or non-
state actors, are subject to the country’s “known and standing” 
laws.105 Thus, governance institutions under such a legal re-
gime do not grant civil servants and political elites wide discre-
tion to either make their own laws, or subvert existing ones, to 
generate extra-legal income for themselves. These elites, like 
other citizens, must respect existing laws and be subject to 
them.106 
                                                                                                             
lamation that poorly performing and opportunistic civilian rulers “make mili-
tary coups inevitable through economic and political mismanagement.” Id. 
However, while in power, military officers did not perform any better than 
the civilian regimes that they had replaced. In addition to the fact that the 
military elites had come to power through extra-constitutional means, they 
considered themselves above the law. In virtually all African countries, mili-
tary rule was pervaded by high levels of corruption, fraud, administrative 
ineptness, gross incompetence, and contempt for the rule of law; conditions 
that the military elites claimed they had seized power with the intention of 
eliminating. As stated by LeVine, intervention of soldiers in the politics of 
African countries epitomized “the low estate to which constitutionalism had 
fallen during the [period] 1963–89” in Africa. LeVine, The Fall and Rise of 
Constitutionalism, supra note 54, at 190. 
 102. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (Harvard University Press 1921). 
 103. Dicey, supra note 66. 
 104. Id. at 181. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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According to Dickinson,107 in a legal system characterized by 
the supremacy of law, “every citizen is entitled, first, to have 
his rights adjudicated in a regular common-law court, and sec-
ondly, to call into question in such a court the legality of any 
act done by an administrative tribunal.”108 Throughout most of 
post-independence Africa, governments have operated with im-
punity, with those who are supposed to serve the public inter-
est—the so-called state custodians—considering themselves 
above the law. In the words of Dicey, the existence of the rule of 
law in a country means “that no man is above the law, but that 
every man, whatever his rank or condition, is subject to the or-
dinary law of the realm, and amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary tribunals. . . . With us, every official, from Prime Min-
ister down to a constable or collector of taxes, is under the 
same responsibility for every act done without legal justifica-
tion as any other citizen.”109 
But, is not supremacy of law a concept that is uniquely a 
“central and most characteristic feature of . . . Anglo-American 
juristic habit”?110 In the mid-1980s and early-1990s, there were 
mass demonstrations throughout Africa. Led by grassroots or-
ganizations, these anti-government riots were designed to oust 
authoritarian regimes and bring about people-driven institu-
tional reforms to enhance the deepening and institutionaliza-
tion of democracy.111 Implicit in these agitations for political 
transformation was the belief that the only way to bring about 
the peaceful coexistence of each country’s diverse population 
groups, as well as provide an enabling environment for the cre-
                                                                                                             
 107. Dickinson, supra note 102, at 34–35. 
 108. Id. at 35. 
 109. Id. at 34. 
 110. Id. at 32–33. 
 111. See generally TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 3 
(outlining Africa’s transition-to-democracy movement of the mid-1980s and 
early 1990s). Of course, on December 17, 2010, a Tunisian street vendor set 
himself on fire in protest of his harassment by local government operatives. 
This act of self-immolation re-awakened the desire of citizens of several 
North African and Middle Eastern countries for democracy and the rule of 
law. This re-awakening produced mass demonstrations, some violent, that 
led to the ouster of many of the region’s long-serving authoritarian regimes 
and set the stage for institutional reforms to deepen and institutionalize 
democratic governance. Unfortunately, such people-driven, participatory, and 
bottom-up institutional reforms were never undertaken and the struggle to 
bring about the rule of law in these countries remains a work in progress. 
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ation of wealth, was to introduce into each country institutional 
arrangements that guarantee the supremacy of law.112 If the 
law is supreme, implying that citizens, including those who 
serve in the government, do not consider themselves above the 
law, then citizens would be able to more effectively challenge 
and scrutinize the behaviors of those who govern them. Where 
citizens are able to question the actions of civil servants and 
politicians, the latter will find it quite difficult to engage in cor-
ruption and other growth-inhibiting behaviors like rent seek-
ing, and as a result, public impunity would be minimized. Such 
a process can significantly enhance accountability.113 
In a study of Cameroon, Nantang Jua was unable to find a 
single instance in which the government’s anti-corruption pro-
grams had ever successfully brought a high-ranking civil serv-
ant or political elite to justice.114 He determined that: 
[t]he Financial Disciplinary Committee of the Ministry of 
Public Service occasionally prosecutes low-ranking govern-
ment officials such as postmasters, school bookkeepers and, 
from time to time, a few men of managerial rank. This can be 
seen as a device that, in a quest to enhance its legitimacy, the 
state uses to satisfy society’s clarion call that sanctions be 
meted out on deviating bureaucrats. That higher-level bu-
reaucrats are largely immune from trial by the Disciplinary 
Committee is evidence that Cameroon has an attenuated pat-
rimonial administrative structure in which public discussion 
and/or criticism of the alleged acts of some members of the 
ruling class is still taboo.115 
                                                                                                             
 112. See generally TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 3. 
 113. See generally MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1. 
 114. Nantang Jua, Cameroon: Jump-starting an Economic Crisis, 21 AFR. 
INSIGHT 162 (1991). 
 115. Id. at 166. It is important to note, however, that some high-ranking 
officials were supposedly prosecuted and imprisoned for engagement in cor-
rupt activities. These individuals were grouped into two main categories—
“sacrificial lambs” and “fall guys.” As determined by Mbaku, “‘sacrificial 
lambs’ are members of the incumbent ruling coalition who are carefully se-
lected and then run through a phony and opportunistic anti-corruption pro-
gram in which the individual’s ‘conviction’ is a forgone conclusion. Such con-
viction is followed by the imposition of ridiculously long prison sentences or 
exile. However, no genuine effort is made to recover the stolen public re-
sources. This process usually satisfies the people’s desire for sanctions 
against civil servants who have abused the public trust.” Eventually, the dis-
graced civil servant is later “rehabilitated,” brought back into the government 
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Despite the fact that since the 1990s Cameroon’s political 
economy has changed significantly and the country now has a 
functioning multiparty “democratic” system of governance, the 
rule of law, specifically supremacy of law, remains elusive. In 
fact, “journalists who venture into investigations of the so-
called ‘untouchables’ have found their newspapers seized by 
the government, their lives threatened, or worse—many of 
them have ended up in prison.”116 For example, the late Pius 
Njawé, considered Cameroon’s foremost independent journalist 
and publisher of Le Messager, was fined and imprisoned by the 
Biya regime for publishing, in his newspaper, an article seek-
ing answers to the simple question: “Is President Biya Sick?”117 
Cameroon, like many other countries in Africa, has not been 
able to provide itself with a legal system in which the law is 
supreme. As a result, most high-ranking civil servants and po-
litical elites in these countries consider themselves above the 
law and act with impunity. Citizens are unable to hold those 
who govern accountable, and corruption is pervasive, effective-
ly constraining investment in productive activities, leading to 
the failure of Cameroon and the other African countries in the 
same situation to create the wealth that they need to confront 
poverty and deprivation, and to improve national living stand-
ards. 
In the 1980s, Gould and Mukendi conducted a study of cor-
ruption in Zaire, and determined that wealthy and politically-
connected individuals considered themselves above the law. 
Under the legal system existing in Zaire at the time, these 
highly-placed individuals, all of whom were politically well-
connected to the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko, con-
sidered themselves “untouchables” and hence, not subject to 
                                                                                                             
and, in many cases, assigned positions of higher rank than the ones from 
which they had been sacked. “‘Fall guys’ fall into two main categories: (1) top 
civil servants who have fallen out of favor with the incumbent ruling coalition 
and, unlike sacrificial lambs, are not considered loyal enough to be rehabili-
tated; and (2) low-level civil servants who are considered dispensable. When 
these individuals are ‘judged’ guilty of corruption, there is not much chance 
that the regime will rehabilitate them and return them to the public ser-
vices.” MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 97–98. 
 116. MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 97. 
 117. Lyombe Eko, Hear All Evil, See All Evil, Rail Against All Evil: Le Mes-
sager and the Journalism of Resistance in Cameroon, in THE LEADERSHIP 
CHALLENGE IN AFRICA: CAMEROON UNDER PAUL BIYA 123 (John Mukum Mbaku 
& Joseph Takougang eds., 2004). 
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the country’s known and standing laws.118 Thus, it was rare to 
find a high-ranking civil servant or politician, or an individual 
of high wealth status in Zaire who was either subject to the law 
or who did not consider himself or herself above the law. Such 
well-placed individuals were regularly involved in corrupt 
deals, but were rarely prosecuted. Even if they appeared before 
a court of law, they were not likely to be convicted because, as 
determined by Gould and Mukendi, adjudication of court cases 
was not based on established legal rules and the facts present-
ed in court, but on the wealth and political status of the indi-
vidual. 119 
What Gould and Mukendi found in Zaire was not unique to 
that country. Throughout the continent, many civil servants 
and political elites continue to consider themselves above the 
law. Either because of the pervasiveness of corruption, or the 
fact that the judiciary in these countries is controlled by the 
executive, most of these high-ranking political operatives are 
rarely, if ever, brought to justice for their complicity in corrup-
tion and other forms of opportunism. 120  As a consequence, 
growth-inhibiting behaviors—in short, corruption, rent seek-
ing, and financial malfeasance—are pervasive throughout 
many countries in the continent.121 
                                                                                                             
 118. David J. Gould & Tshiabukole B. Mukendi, Bureaucratic Corruption in 
Africa: Causes, Consequences and Remedies, 12 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 427, 429 
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 119. Id. at 429–30. 
 120. See generally Fombad, supra note 100; MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, 
supra note 1, at 100; DAVID J. GOULD, BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND 
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CORRUPTION, CONSEQUENCES AND CONTROL (M. Clarke ed., 1983); CORRUPTION 
AND THE CRISIS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, supra note 1. 
 121. For example, during the time he was president of Nigeria (1993–1998), 
Sani Abacha stole US$2–$5 billion from the Nigerian economy. Mobutu Sese 
Seko, who was head of state in Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo from 1965 
to 1997, is reported to have stolen as much as US$5 billion. Robin Rhodes, 
Introduction, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 11 (Transparency International 
ed., 2004). On May 3, 2012, Salva Kiir, president of South Sudan, Africa’s 
newest country and one of the continent’s poorest, sent a letter to seventy-five 
high-ranking current and former government officials accusing them of steal-
ing as much as US$4 billion from the national treasury. David Smith, South 
Sudan President Accuses Officials of Stealing $4bn of Public Money, 
GUARDIAN (June 5, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/05/south-sudan-president-accuses-
officials-stealing. Even without conducting an empirical study to determine 
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In the struggle to create the wealth that Africans need to ad-
dress mass poverty and deprivation, it is very important that 
each African country undertake necessary reforms to provide 
institutional arrangements that guarantee the supremacy of 
law and force all citizens—including those who hold high-
ranking positions in the government, as well as those who are 
financially well-to-do—to subject themselves to the law. Unless 
this is done, corruption and other growth-inhibiting behaviors 
will continue to frustrate these countries’ ability to deal effec-
tively with poverty. 
C. Voluntary Acceptance of and Respect for the Law 
The American Bar Association, which has taken a leadership 
role in the promotion of the rule of law in developing and tran-
sition countries, has stated that “[i]t is very difficult for a na-
tion to maintain the rule of law if its citizens do not respect the 
law.”122 While citizens can be forced to obey the law through 
government coercion, usually with the help of the police and 
military forces, such a legal system is extremely costly and dif-
ficult to maintain or sustain.123 However, if the majority of citi-
zens voluntarily accept and respect the law, they are more like-
                                                                                                             
the impact of such theft of public resources on the economy, one can anecdo-
tally see that there is severe damage to the country and its people, especially 
considering the fact that these are poor and highly deprived economies. Con-
sider the fact that all four countries—Nigeria, Congo, DRC, and South Su-
dan—are  considered by virtually all international development indicators as 
either having low human development levels or suffering from extreme pov-
erty. The resources, which were diverted by politicians and civil servants to 
their personal use, could have been employed to provide basic services such 
as primary education, healthcare, nutrition for children, prenatal care for 
pregnant women, and clean water, especially for infants. See generally 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 
2011. 
 122. A.B.A. Division of Public Education, supra note 73, at 5. 
 123. Nigeria is a good example of a country that has been unable to main-
tain an efficiently functioning and effective legal and judicial system. In fact, 
during the last several decades, the Nigerian legal system has been so inef-
fective that citizens have resorted to vigilantism as a way to protect them-
selves and their property, as criminals take over the streets and neighbor-
hoods. See generally David Pratten, Introduction: Perspectives on Vigilantism 
in Nigeria, 78 AFR: J. INT’L AFR. INST. 1 (2008). See also DOMESTICATING 
VIGILANTISM IN AFRICA: SOUTH AFRICA, NIGERIA, BENIN, CÔTE D’IVOIRE, AND 
BURKINA FASO (Thomas G. Kirsch & Tilo Grätz eds., 2010); POLICING 
DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES (Mercedes S. Hinton & Tim Newburn eds., 2009). 
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ly to comply, significantly minimizing the costs of compliance. 
As stated by the ABA, “[t]he rule of law functions because [the 
majority of citizens] agree that it is important to observe the 
law, even if a police officer is not present to enforce it.”124 
Of course, the main question for an African country strug-
gling to institutionalize the rule of law is: how can the govern-
ment create an atmosphere in which citizens will accept and 
respect the law? The answer lies in what the country’s laws are 
and how they are enacted. First, the laws enacted and adopted 
by the country must be those that citizens can obey, and obey 
willingly. As stated by U.S. suffragist and advocate of women’s 
rights, Elizabeth Cady Staton, “[t]o make laws that man cannot 
and will not obey, serves to bring all law into contempt. It is 
very important in a republic that the people should respect the 
laws, for if we throw them to the winds, what becomes of civil 
government?”125 If, however, the laws that exist in a country 
are those that citizens cannot or are unwilling to comply with, 
the country’s counteracting agencies—typically, the police and 
the judiciary—face an uphill battle in trying to force compli-
ance. Within such an institutional environment, maintaining 
law and order would either be extremely difficult or virtually 
impossible, especially for countries with limited resources to 
devote to law enforcement. Where the laws are extremely com-
plex or difficult to understand, or are not relevant to the lives 
of the people and the problems they face, the people are less 
likely to respect and willingly obey them.126 
                                                                                                             
 124. A.B.A. Division of Public Education, supra note 73, at 5 (emphasis 
added). 
 125. Id. (quoting Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Tenth National Women’s Rights 
Convention (May 10–11, 1860)).  
 126. Except for customs and traditions, laws in most African countries to-
day are often adaptations of those left behind by the colonial government. In 
addition to the fact that the constitutions of all francophone countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, except Guinea, are based on the Constitution of the French 
Fifth Republic (1958), many of the penal codes in these countries are actually 
based on those that were in existence during the colonial period. By accepting 
Charles de Gaulle’s offer of free association as autonomous republics within 
the Communauté française (French Community), the francophone sub-
Saharan African countries effectively deprived their citizens of the opportuni-
ty to engage in robust constitutional discourse and produce laws and institu-
tions that reflected their values, interests, aspirations, and customs. Such 
laws, had they been selected by each colony’s relevant stakeholders, would 
have been those that they were willing and able to obey, and which were rel-
evant to their lives. 
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Second, citizens see the law as a tool that they can use to or-
ganize their private lives—for example, to start and run a 
business for profit, acquire and dispose of property, get mar-
ried, engage in contracting, protect one’s values from en-
croachment by either state or non-state actors, or otherwise 
engage in productive activities to create wealth. The law can 
also serve as an important instrument used by groups and 
communities, especially ethnic and religious groups, to protect 
their beliefs and practices from government interference. Most 
African countries have extremely diverse populations.127 At in-
dependence, some groups—such as ethno-regional coalitions in 
West, East, and Central Africa, and religious groups in North 
Africa—captured control of the evacuated structures of colonial 
hegemony. Many minority ethnic and religious groups came to 
believe that public policy in their countries was controlled and 
dominated by the politically-dominant groups—that is, those 
that now controlled the apparatus of government—and that the 
minority groups were being systematically marginalized, de-
prived, and effectively pushed out to the economic and political 
periphery.128 
In a country where the rule of law functions effectively, eth-
nic and religious groups (or, for that matter, any group at all) 
that consider themselves marginalized or deprived do not have 
to resort to violent and destructive mobilization in order to im-
prove their condition. They can, on the other hand, utilize the 
law to assert their rights. They can, for example, bring legal 
action against offending parties, whether these are state- or 
                                                                                                             
 127. Cameroon has more than 250 ethnic groups, South Africa, at least 10, 
and Nigeria, more than 250. See MBAKU, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF 
CAMEROON, supra note 22, at 5; FUNSO S. AFOLAYAN, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS 
OF SOUTH AFRICA (2004); TOYIN FALOLA, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF NIGERIA 
(2001). 
 128. This was the main argument given by the Ibo-dominated Biafrans 
when they sought to secede from the Federal Republic of Nigeria and form 
their own sovereign state. The Ibos argued that they had, since independence 
in 1960, been marginalized and discriminated against by the ethno-regional 
coalition (the Hausa-Fulani/Yoruba) that controlled the central government 
in what was then the capital city, Lagos. See, e.g., RALPH UWECHUE, 
REFLECTIONS ON THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR: FACING THE FUTURE (2004) (provid-
ing a rigorous examination of the Nigerian civil war, which came directly out 
of the struggle by Biafra for secession and independence); ALFRED OBIORA 
UZOKWE, SURVIVING IN BIAFRA: THE STORY OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR (2003) 
(providing an account of the war by a survivor of the conflict). 
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non-state actors, or present members of the group as candi-
dates for election to important positions in the country’s politi-
cal system. 
Citizens are more likely to accept and respect the law if rep-
resentatives that they choose are the ones responsible for de-
signing and adopting those laws. Making certain that the pro-
cess through which the laws are made is participatory and in-
clusive achieves at least two critical objectives: first, that the 
resulting laws are locally-focused and therefore relevant to the 
lives of the people whose behaviors the laws are expected to 
regulate, reflecting their values; and second, that the laws are 
those that the people understand, respect, and are able and 
willing to obey. If the laws are externally imposed, they are not 
likely to reflect the people’s values, nor would they be relevant 
to their lives. 
Consequently, the third way to enhance the ability of Afri-
cans to accept and respect their laws is to make sure that the 
process through which laws are enacted in each country is open 
and transparent, and that citizens who so desire can partici-
pate fully; either directly, by participating in the political pro-
cess, for instance by getting elected to a legislative position; or 
indirectly, by influencing the political system through voting, 
or using available public and private mechanisms to voice their 
opinions and try to shape public policy outcomes. Openness and 
transparency help the people know what the law is, understand 
the law, and make certain that the law reflects their values 
and is relevant to their lives, effectively enhancing compliance. 
Additionally, if the law-making process is open and transpar-
ent, citizens will be able to understand and appreciate the rea-
son why a specific law has been enacted and why they must 
obey it.129 
The decolonization and immediate post-independence periods 
were supposed to offer Africans opportunities to engage in 
democratic constitution-making so that they could choose their 
own laws and institutions. Unfortunately, constitution-making 
in virtually all African countries at this time was top-down, 
elite-driven, and non-participatory, depriving citizens of each 
country of the opportunity to develop institutional arrange-
ments capable of providing them with appropriate governance 
mechanisms. What these countries ended up adopting were 
                                                                                                             
 129. A.B.A. Division of Public Education, supra note 73, at 5. 
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laws and institutions that did not reflect local realities, the 
specificities of each country, or the values critical to the majori-
ty of each country’s relevant stakeholders. Basically, the non-
participatory and non-inclusive, and to a certain extent, secre-
tive, 130  approach to constitution- and law-making in these 
countries produced institutional arrangements that the majori-
ty of citizens did not know or understand, and were therefore 
unwilling to accept or obey. In post-independence Cameroon 
and indeed, in many other African countries, citizens came to 
see national laws and institutions as part of an illegitimate le-
gal regime designed to oppress and exploit them for the benefit 
of the ruling elites and their foreign benefactors.131 
Finally, to make sure that citizens accept and respect the 
laws, the laws must be relevant to their lives and the problems 
that they face on a regular basis. Citizens must see the law as 
an instrument that they can use to deal effectively with every-
day problems, including organizing their lives and peacefully 
resolving conflicts, including those that arise from trade and 
other forms of free exchange. If, however, citizens view the 
laws and institutions as “alien” impositions, used by the politi-
cal elites to oppress and exploit them, they are more likely to 
refuse to recognize these laws, let alone obey them. Within 
such a context, compliance becomes very difficult—the police 
                                                                                                             
 130. For example, in the U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons under French 
administration, the constitution for the independence of the territory was 
“compacted” by the Consultative Committee, created by Law No. 59-56 of 
October 31, 1959. In addition to the fact that the committee was not elected 
by Cameroonians, it carried out most of its work in Paris and the final text 
was a thinly disguised copy of the French Constitution of 1958. In fact, the 
Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), the “country’s largest and most 
important indigenous political party and one that represented a significant 
part of national political opinion, was denied participation in the constitu-
tion-making process.” Excluding the UPC from participating in the constitu-
tion-making process effectively “eliminated a significant portion of national 
political opinion from constitutional discourse.” MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND 
REFORM IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 81. 
 131. See MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 64–74 (discussing 
the endemic nature of corruption and other forms of political opportunism in 
post-independence Africa and how this situation has been made possible by 
laws that failed to adequately constrain the state); LeVine, supra note 42, at 
187–88 (examining the failure of West African countries to undertake demo-
cratic constitution-making to provide themselves with locally-focused laws 
and institutions—that is, laws and institutions that reflect the people’s val-
ues and are relevant to their lives). 
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and other enforcement agencies may be totally overwhelmed 
and simply unable to perform their constitutionally assigned 
functions, effectively allowing society to degenerate into chaos 
and violence.132 
D. Judicial Independence 
It is virtually impossible to maintain the rule of law in a 
country if its judiciary does not operate independently of the 
other branches of government. Judicial independence is a mul-
tifaceted concept that specifically requires that judicial officers 
be granted “security of tenure,” “financial security,” and “insti-
tutional independence.”133 According to Judge Louraine C. Ark-
feld, a one-time chair of the ABA Judicial Division Rule of Law 
and International Courts Committee, the following are the five 
critical principles of judicial independence: 
 Decisional independence allows fair and impartial judges 
to decide cases pursuant to the rule of law and the govern-
ing constitutions unaffected by personal interest or 
threats or pressure from any source. 
 Institutional independence recognizes the judiciary as a 
separate and co-equal branch of government charged with 
administering justice pursuant to the rule of law and as a 
constitutional partner with the executive and legislative 
branches authorized to manage its own internal opera-
tions without undue interference from the other branches. 
                                                                                                             
 132. During Ahidjo’s term as president of a unified Cameroon (1961–1982), 
he devoted a significant amount of the country’s limited resources to cultivat-
ing and sustaining extremely repressive and oppressive police agencies. 
These agencies, notably the BMM (Brigade Mixte Mobile) and Sedoc (Service 
d’études et de la documentation), were used effectively by Ahidjo to torture 
and force the people to conform to dysfunctional and anachronistic laws, all of 
which were designed to empower Ahidjo and his ethno-regional client net-
work. Thus, while Ahidjo was able to maintain peace in Cameroon, this was 
not done through providing citizens with laws that they could voluntarily 
obey and which enhanced their ability to organize their private lives and live 
peacefully with their neighbors. Peaceful coexistence in Ahidjo’s Cameroon, 
like that during the colonial period, however, was achieved through the em-
ployment of extreme and brutal force by the state. See Abel Eyinga, Govern-
ment by State of Emergency, in GAULLIST AFRICA: CAMEROON UNDER AHMADOU 
AHIDJO 100 (Richard A. Joseph ed., 1978). 
 133. Valente v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, paras. 27, 40, 47. This is the 
case by the Supreme Court of Canada that set the standard for judicial inde-
pendence in Canada. 
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 Fair and impartial courts require competent judges who 
have been selected for their merit, who represent the di-
versity of their community, and who are provided with ac-
cess to the law and continuing legal education provided by 
nonpolitical sources. 
 An independent judiciary must have adequate resources 
including a budget that provides for adequate facilities 
and equipment, security, and just compensation for judg-
es. In developing countries, the ability to provide security 
protections for judges is essential to their ability to decide 
without fear. 
 There also must be a system of accountability for judges 
including a judicial code of ethics as well as a process for 
citizens to file complaints against judges for illegal or un-
ethical conduct and an impartial disciplinary system that 
allows for a range of sanctions and removal of errant 
judges.134 
Judicial independence, as argued by the ABA, is built on a 
foundation in which judges are fair and impartial, there is sep-
aration of powers (the judiciary is a separate and co-equal 
branch of government), the selection of judges is based on merit 
and these judges represent the diversity of their communities, 
the judiciary and the judges who serve in them are granted 
enough resources and security, and judges are accountable to 
the U.S. Constitution.135 
In framing the U.S. Constitution, the founders of the Ameri-
can Republic made certain that judicial independence was pro-
vided for and guaranteed. As part of the effort to entrench judi-
cial independence in the constitution, the framers made certain 
that all federal judges are guaranteed life tenure and their 
compensation is protected against diminution. According to Ar-
ticle III(2) of the U.S. Constitution: 
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both 
of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for 
                                                                                                             
 134. Judge Louraine C. Arkfeld, The Rule of Law and an Independent Judi-
ciary, 46 JUDGES J. 12–14 (2007). 
 135. Id. 
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their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office.136 
As argued by Chief Judge Abner J. Mikva of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, “[i]f the judges are given a 
role of reviewing the actions of the political branches as against 
a written constitution and its protective features, judicial inde-
pendence must be built into the constitution itself.”137 Judge 
Mikva then concludes by saying that a truly independent judi-
ciary “must be protected from any institution or group capable 
of creating pressure. This means not only the ancient power of 
sovereigns to dismiss judges at their pleasure, but also the 
more subtle ability of officials to interfere with the administra-
tion of justice.”138 
Of course, the constitutions of virtually all African countries 
have some provision guaranteeing the independence of the ju-
diciary. 139  For example, the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa (1996) states, at § 165, that: 
(1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the 
courts. 
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Consti-
tution and the law, which they must apply impartially and 
without fear, favor or prejudice. 
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the func-
tioning of the courts. 
(4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, 
must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independ-
ence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of 
the courts. 
                                                                                                             
 136. U.S. CONST., art. III(2). 
 137. Judge Abner J. Mikva, The Need for an Independent Judiciary: Impli-
cations for South African Reform, 8 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 621 (1993). 
 138. Id. at 622–23. 
 139. African constitutions that expressly provide for judicial independence 
include Ghana (Articles 125 & 127); Namibia (Article 78); Uganda (Articles 
126 & 128); Zambia (Article 91); and Egypt (Articles 165 & 166). For a dis-
cussion of judicial independence in Africa, see H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in 
Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contempo-
rary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239, 1304–7 (2006). 
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(5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to 
whom and organs of state to which it applies.140 
The independence of the judiciary has been recognized by 
South Africa’s Constitutional Court in several cases, holding 
that “judicial independence . . . is foundational to and indispen-
sable for the discharge of the judicial function in a constitu-
tional democracy based on the rule of law.”141 In its ruling, the 
Constitutional Court endorsed the view expressed by the Su-
preme Court of Canada in R v. Valente142 that the minimum 
requirements for judicial independence are “security of ten-
ure,”143 “financial security”144 free from “arbitrary interference 
by the Executive in a manner that could affect judicial inde-
pendence,”145 and “institutional independence with respect to 
matters of administration bearing directly on the exercise of 
the judicial function . . . [and] judicial control over the adminis-
trative decisions that bear directly and immediately on the ex-
ercise of the judicial function.”146 
In addition, South Africa’s Constitutional Court has also held 
that: 
[t]he Constitution thus not only recognizes that courts are in-
dependent and impartial, but also provides important institu-
tional protection for the courts. The provisions of section 165, 
forming part of the Constitution that is the supreme law, ap-
ply to all courts and judicial officers, including magistrates’ 
courts and magistrates. These provisions bind the judiciary 
and the government and are enforceable by the superior 
courts, including this Court.147 
Through its various rulings, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa has made clear that judicial independence has two 
important dimensions: individual independence, providing that 
when adjudicating cases, judicial officers must be independent 
and impartial; and institutional independence, meaning specif-
ic structures and guarantees must be provided so that judicial 
                                                                                                             
 140. S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
 141. De Lange v. Smuts (1998)[3]SA 785[CC], para. 59. 
 142. Valente v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673. 
 143. Id. para. 27. 
 144. Id. para. 40. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. paras. 47, 52. 
 147. Van Rooyen v. The State (2002)[5]SA 24[CC], para. 18. 
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officers and the courts are adequately protected against inter-
ference from external actors. Such external actors include the 
other branches of government, notably the executive, who are 
likely to come before the judiciary.148 
Cameroon is one country that has failed to guarantee judicial 
independence. The country’s constitution guarantees judicial 
independence—“[j]udicial power shall be exercised by the Su-
preme Court, Courts of Appeal and Tribunals,”149 and “[t]he 
Judicial Power shall be independent of executive and legisla-
tive powers.” 150  Nevertheless, the constitution also declares 
that “[t]he President of the Republic shall guarantee the inde-
pendence of judicial power. He shall appoint members of the 
bench and for the legal department.” 151  By assigning one 
branch of government the power to guarantee the independ-
ence of another, the framers of Cameroon’s Constitution could 
not have been thinking of true judicial independence and sepa-
ration of powers. According to C. M. Fombad, “[a] careful anal-
ysis of the constitutional provisions,”152 “show[s] that the 1996 
amendment did not add anything substantive to the pre-
existing practice which would lend any credence to the exist-
ence of a separate and independent judiciary in Cameroon.”153 
According to Fombad,154 all of Cameroon’s post-independence 
chief executives—the country has had only two heads-of-state 
since reunification in 1961—have enjoyed absolute power and 
control over the judiciary branch through the control of the ap-
                                                                                                             
 148. This can be seen in the Constitutional Court’s decisions in De Lange v. 
Smuts and Van Rooyen v. The State. See also AMY GORDON & DAVID BRUCE, 
THE TRANSFORMATION AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA (2006). 
 149. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, art. 37(2). 
 150. Id. art. 37(3). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Cameroon’s 1996 Constitution was an amended version of the 1972 
Constitution. Part of the objectives of those who developed the amendments 
was supposedly to improve the constitution’s formal restraint mechanisms 
and prevent arbitrary exercise of government agency. The amendments for-
mally introduced the concept of the separation of powers, judicial independ-
ence, and freedom of expression. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
CAMEROON, arts. 37(2), (3). However, as already discussed, these efforts have 
not been effective in fostering the separation of powers, in particular, and the 
rule of law, in general, in Cameroon. 
 153. Fombad, supra note 100, at 247. See also Fombad, Judicial Power in 
Cameroon’s Amended Constitution, supra note 14. 
 154. Fombad, supra note 100, at 247–48. 
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pointment and promotion of judiciary officers, and budgetary 
allocations to the judiciary. In addition, Fombad determined 
that shortly before the elections of 1996 and 1997, President 
Paul Biya issued a decree doubling the salaries of judicial offic-
ers, and raised, by almost 200%, the compensation rates for 
justices of the supreme court who have the authority to certify 
the results of each election, including the presidential elec-
tion.155 
Since reunification and the formation of what is now the Re-
public of Cameroon, the country’s constitution has not provided 
for the effective separation of powers. As a consequence, the 
universally accepted elements of the rule of law do not actually 
exist under the terms of Cameroon’s 1996 Constitution—the 
guarantee of security of tenure, financial security, and institu-
tional independence of the judiciary have all been left to the 
vagaries of the political process, and specifically to the discre-
tion of the president of the Republic, another branch of gov-
ernment. This, of course, is in line with the imperial presidency 
that was created by the adoption of the Gaullist model of gov-
ernment in the former U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons un-
der French administration, when it gained independence on 
January 1, 1960.156 That model of government remained in ef-
fect when the Republic of Cameroon united with the former 
U.N. Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British 
administration, on October 1, 1961, to form what is now pre-
sent Cameroon.157 
                                                                                                             
 155. Id. 
 156. See generally LEVINE, supra note 42 (detailing constitution-making in 
the U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration). The 
Trust Territory gained independence on January 1, 1960, and took the name 
République du Cameroun. 
 157. Id.; MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA, supra note 1 (detail-
ing, inter alia, the struggles of Africans to provide themselves with institu-
tional arrangements that adequately constrain the state); John Mukum 
Mbaku, Cameroon’s Stalled Transition to Democratic Governance: Lessons for 
Africa’s Democrats, 1 AFR. ASIAN STUD. 125, 125–26 (2002). Note that the pol-
ity that emerged from the unification of the former U.N. Trust Territory of 
Southern Cameroons under British administration and the then République 
du Cameroun was a federation called the Federal Republic of Cameroon (Ré-
publique Fédérale du Cameroun) with Ahmadou Ahidjo as president. A new 
constitution was adopted in 1972 and effectively abrogated the federation, 
turning the latter into a unitary state. In 1984, Paul Biya, who had succeeded 
Ahidjo as president in 1982, changed the name of the country to Republic of 
Cameroon (République du Cameroun), the name that the country has re-
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E. Openness and Transparency 
In the effort to improve conditions for wealth creation and 
human development in Africa, three aspects of openness and 
transparency are important. First, it is important that the pro-
cess through which the constitution is compacted is transpar-
ent and open so that the participation of each of the country’s 
relevant stakeholders is maximized. Second, post-constitution 
law-making must be open and transparent, so that even those 
who do not actively participate in the political process are 
aware of how laws are made and why certain laws are selected. 
Finally, the design and implementation of public policies is a 
critical element in the fight against behaviors such as rent 
seeking and corruption, which have been found to be major 
constraints to wealth creation and economic growth in Afri-
ca.158 Making certain that the government conducts the peo-
ple’s business openly and in a transparent manner159 signifi-
                                                                                                             
tained to the present moment. See generally MBAKU, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS 
OF CAMEROON, supra note 22. 
 158. For a study of corruption and other forms of opportunism in Africa, see 
MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1. As argued by Gerring and 
Thacker, “[o]penness and transparency, which we may understand as the 
availability and accessibility of relevant information about the functioning of 
the polity, is commonly associated with the absence of corruption. Since cor-
ruption, by definition, violates generally accepted standards of behavior, 
greater transparency should discourage corrupt actions, or at least facilitate 
appropriate mechanisms of punishment (legal, administrative or electoral).” 
John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and Corruption: The 
Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 295, 316 (2004). 
 159. This includes making sure that information about government activi-
ties is presented to the people, and done so in a relatively accessible form and 
manner. Note that while putting information on government websites may at 
first appear to be an effective way to maintain transparency in government 
operations, this method may not be adequate in a country where most citi-
zens do not have access to the Internet. Hence, adoption of a given technology 
to enhance transparency should be context-specific—that is, the ability of the 
people to use the technology should be considered before adoption. Also to be 
considered is the language or languages in which the information would be 
provided to the people. In Africa, most countries have adopted European lan-
guages (French in former French and Belgian colonies; English in former 
British colonies, etc.) as so-called “official languages,” and these are used 
widely in government and commerce. Unfortunately, most of the citizens in 
these countries are not fluent in these foreign languages. Consequently, for 
purposes of making certain that citizens have access to government opera-
tions, the government should provide information in languages that are ac-
cessible to the people. 
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cantly reduces corruption and other forms of political opportun-
ism. Most important, especially for African countries, is the 
fact that openness and transparency in the design and imple-
mentation of public policies significantly enhance participation, 
and hence, improve the chance that policies that reflect the 
values, interests, and aspirations of all of the country’s relevant 
stakeholder groups will result. Where openness and transpar-
ency are maintained, groups such as ethnic and religious mi-
norities that believe that given policies do not adequately re-
flect their values and interests are not likely to resort to violent 
and destructive mobilization, especially if as a result of the 
government’s open approach to policy, these groups either had 
the opportunity to participate fully and effectively in the design 
process, or were aware of how the laws were made and why. 
In studies of good governance, the concepts of “openness” and 
“transparency” are considered to be closely linked, but are not 
synonymous.160 Openness and transparency, as they relate to 
the government, can be understood as “the availability and ac-
cessibility of relevant information about the functioning of the 
polity.”161 According to Lord Nolan, “transparency is said to re-
quire that ‘holders of public office should be as open as possible 
about all decisions and actions they take.’”162 Regardless of how 
transparency is defined or conceived, most scholars and practi-
tioners generally agree that “transparent decisions must be 
clear, integrated into a broader context, logical and rational, 
accessible, truthful and accurate, open (involve stakeholders), 
and accountable.”163 Additionally, “[a] transparent decision rec-
ord should provide enough information to allow an interested 
person to ‘verify claims made’ or otherwise reconstruct both the 
process and rationale for the decision.”164 
In general, transparency enhances the ability of an individu-
al who is interested in a public policy, or thinks or believes a 
                                                                                                             
 160. See, e.g., Gerring and Thacker, supra note 158, at 316. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Deirdre Curtin & Albert Jacob Meijer, Does Transparency Strengthen 
Legitimacy?, 11 INFO. POLITY 109 (2006) (quoting FIRST REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, Cm 2850, HMSO (1995)). 
 163. Christina H. Drew & Timothy L. Nyerges, Transparency of Environ-
mental Decision Making: A Case Study of Soil Cleanup Inside the Hanford 
100 Area, 7 J. RISK RES. 33, 36 (2004). 
 164. Id. at 36 (citing LAURIE GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF 
GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH (2000)). 
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decision might affect them, to understand and appreciate how 
that decision was made or arrived at and why.165 Transparency, 
then, is very important where governments make decisions 
that affect the lives of citizens, for example, public policies on 
health and safety. 166  In fact, in Africa, where a significant 
number of countries have governments that are not representa-
tive of their diverse populations,167 making certain that public 
decisions are made through transparent processes can signifi-
cantly minimize the distrust that many ethnic and religious 
groups have for their governments, especially those that have 
been historically marginalized and pushed to the economic and 
political periphery. Thus, if a minority ethnic or religious group 
argues that government policies are significantly influenced by, 
and essentially benefit the ethno-regional groups that domi-
nate and control the government, an open and transparent ap-
proach to the design and implementation of public policies 
would, at a minimum, (1) provide opportunities for these here-
tofore marginalized groups and communities to participate; 
and (2) also allow them to witness and understand how deci-
sions affecting their lives are made.168 This is especially critical 
for African countries, most of which have extremely diverse 
                                                                                                             
 165. Drew & Nyerges, supra note 163, at 33. 
 166. This includes, especially, policies on environmental health. For exam-
ple, decisions made by government agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) that regulates industrial pollution, can have sig-
nificant impacts on the health of citizens. Hence, those decisions must be 
made in an open and transparent manner. See, e.g., CRAIG E. COLTEN & PETER 
N. SKINNER, THE ROAD TO LOVE CANAL: MANAGING INDUSTRIAL WASTE BEFORE 
EPA (1996) (exploring the tragedy of Love Canal before the formation of the 
EPA and how openness and transparency may have averted the disaster or at 
the very least, minimized its impact on the town and its environs). 
 167. For example, in Cameroon, the Anglophones have persistently com-
plained of political and economic marginalization at the hands of the Franco-
phones who have dominated the government since reunification in 1961. In 
fact, since 1961, the presidency of the Republic has been monopolized by 
Francophones, and some ministries, especially defense and territorial admin-
istration, have never been headed by an Anglophone. See generally Piet Kon-
ings & Francis B. Nyamnjoh, President Paul Biya and the “Anglophone Prob-
lem” in Cameroon, in THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE IN AFRICA: CAMEROON 
UNDER PAUL BIYA 191 (John Mukum Mbaku & Joseph Takougang eds., 2004) 
(examining Anglophone marginalization); Piet Konings & Francis B. 
Nyamnjoh, The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon, 35 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 107, 
207–08 (1997). 
 168. Drew & Nyerges, supra note 163, at 33. 
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populations and have encountered significant ethnic-induced 
violence during the last several decades.169 Much of this vio-
lence has been perpetuated by groups that believe the public 
policies were designed in secret, and were aimed at marginaliz-
ing these groups.170 
Since independence, many African countries have had gov-
ernments that have not been representative of their diverse 
populations. In such polities, openness and transparency, espe-
cially in the design and implementation of public policies, can 
minimize the distrust that some ethnic and religious groups 
have for their governments. Some parts of the population of the 
country171 often believe that national policies are designed to 
benefit members of the ethno-regional groups that dominate 
                                                                                                             
 169. Among African countries with diverse populations that during the last 
several decades have encountered ethnic-induced violence are Sudan, Nige-
ria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, and Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Some of these conflicts have resulted in brutal civil wars. 
See generally JULIUS MUTWOL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA: 
INSURGENT MOTIVATIONS, STATE RESPONSES, AND THIRD-PARTY PEACEMAKING 
IN LIBERIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE (2009); GEORGE KLAY KIEH, JR., THE 
FIRST LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR: THE CRISIS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (2008); 
UWECHUE, supra note 128; MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME 
KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (2001); D.H. 
JOHNSON, THE ROOT CAUSES OF SUDAN’S CIVIL WARS (2003); HEALING THE 
WOUND: PERSONAL NARRATIVES ABOUT THE 2007 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN 
KENYA (Kimani Njogu ed., 2009); THOMAS TURNER, THE CONGO WARS: 
CONFLICT, MYTH & REALITY (2007). 
 170. Such groups include the indigenous ethnic groups in Liberia, which 
argued that the government of the country had been dominated and con-
trolled by the Americo-Liberians since 1847. The Americo-Liberian hegemo-
ny, the indigenous groups argued, had developed public policies, usually 
without the participation of members of indigenous ethnic groups, which had 
effectively impoverished the indigenous peoples and pushed them to the eco-
nomic and political periphery. This was one of the reasons advanced by Mas-
ter Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, a member of the Krahn ethnic group, when 
he overthrew the government of William R. Tolbert, an Americo-Liberian. 
Doe subsequently executed Tolbert and members of his cabinet and assumed 
the presidency of Liberia. Shortly after the coup, “[t]he majority of Liberians 
welcomed the coup.” MUTWOL, supra note 169, at 51. Such perceived margin-
alization at the hands of a central government that was dominated by people 
from other groups was the motivation behind the attempt by the Igbos to se-
cede from the rest of Nigeria, and with other minority groups, form the Re-
public of Biafra. See generally ALEXANDER A. MADIEBO, THE NIGERIAN 
REVOLUTION AND THE BIAFRAN WAR (1980). 
 171. For example, the Anglophones of Cameroon. See Konings & Nyamnjoh, 
supra note 167. 
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and control the government exclusively.172 Transparency and 
openness in the design and implementation of public policies 
will provide opportunities for minority groups to participate in, 
as well as enhance their ability to understand how government 
decisions affecting their lives are made.173 
Today, corruption is one of the most important constraints to 
wealth creation and economic growth in Africa.174 While there 
                                                                                                             
 172. For example, the groups that engineered the civil wars that brutalized 
the citizens of Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, gave as reason for their 
actions the marginalization of their own groups at the hands of a central gov-
ernment dominated by other groups. For example, in overthrowing the gov-
ernment of Liberia on April 12, 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe 
sought to bring to an end the Americo-Liberian hegemony that had exploited 
and marginalized the country’s indigenous groups since 1847, including Doe’s 
Krahn ethnic group. In fact, shortly after Doe executed the overthrow of the 
government of William R. Tolbert, “[t]he majority of Liberians welcomed the 
coup; the indigenous people especially rejoiced that they had finally attained 
the power and full rights that had been denied to them for far too long.” 
MUTWOL, supra note 169, at 51. 
 173. See, e.g., Drew & Nyerges, supra note 163. Note that although Doe, as 
well as the leaders of the events that led to civil wars in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, and the Rwanda genocide, may have used supposed or perceived mar-
ginalization of the groups to which they belonged as the reason for their ac-
tions, as history has since proved, these individuals were opportunists seek-
ing ways to capture the government so that they could use its structures to 
enrich themselves. Their intentions, as proven by the actions that they took 
once they had control of the apparatus of government, were not to right any 
perceived or actual wrongs and make governance and resource allocation 
more efficient and equitable. In the case of Liberia, for example, this is evi-
denced by the level of brutality visited on the various population groups in 
the country, as well as the wanton destruction of private property and the 
country’s social overhead capital—schools, roads, power lines, and other in-
frastructure—by the Doe regime. See, e.g., KIEH, JR., supra note 169 (present-
ing an alternative to the dominant view that the Liberian civil war was 
caused by historical conflicts between the country’s various ethnic groups; 
instead, he argues that the war was a result of the failure by those who es-
tablished the Liberian state in 1847 and successive governments to provide 
the state with institutional arrangements that would have enhanced the abil-
ity of all groups to live together peacefully and maximize their values). 
 174. See generally Fombad, supra note 100 (presenting studies of corruption 
and how the latter affects the economies of several African countries). Note 
that corruption is not only an obstacle to economic growth, but it is also a 
constraint to human development. For example, in their efforts to enrich 
themselves through corrupt practices, civil servants in many African coun-
tries often allocate public goods and services arbitrarily and capriciously, 
favoring those citizens that are willing and able to bribe them. As a conse-
quence, the poor, virtually all of whom do not have the resources to supply 
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are many ways to clean up corruption and minimize its impact 
on wealth creation, the most important are openness and 
transparency, especially in government operations. As argued 
by Gerring and Thacker,175 “[s]ince corruption, by definition, 
violates generally accepted standards of behavior, greater 
transparency should discourage corrupt actions, or at least fa-
cilitate appropriate mechanisms of punishment (legal, adminis-
trative or electoral).”176 Generally, even in countries where cor-
ruption is endemic, the public usually does not condone corrupt 
behavior, especially within the bureaucracy. In fact, the pro-
ductive sector—that is, the private sector, which is responsible 
for creating wealth—sees bureaucratic corruption as a serious 
obstacle to the profitability of its enterprises. Ordinary citizens, 
on the other hand, consider the corrupt behaviors of civil serv-
ants and political elites as a form of interference with their 
ability to organize their lives and improve their welfare. 177 
Some scholars have argued that “[c]orruption often results 
from a lack of accountability and participation.”178 Hence, legal 
and institutional schemes that enhance citizen participation 
and force more accountability of the governing to the governed, 
and by implication, to the constitution, can help significantly in 
the fight against corruption.179 
Public sectors in many African economies are notorious for 
having extremely high levels of corruption.180 In the provision 
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of public services for example, civil servants in many African 
countries are known to act arbitrarily and capriciously, favor-
ing those individuals who pay them bribes.181 In these econo-
mies, openness and transparency can serve two important, 
separate but related purposes. As argued by Stirton and Lodge, 
“[t]he first is to ensure that public service providers respect 
both the positive and negative rights of individuals.”182 They 
argue further that “[t]his instrumental justification for trans-
parency of public services comes close to Bentham’s principle 
for good governance: ‘The more strictly we are watched, the 
better we behave.’”183 The second purpose, argue Stirton and 
Lodge, “relates more directly to democratic theory, which val-
ues participation by individuals in the decisions that affect 
them.”184 Young185 argues that 
[p]articipatory approaches to democratic theory hold that de-
mocracy is a hollow set of institutions if they only allow citi-
zens to vote on representatives to far away political institu-
tions and protect those citizens from government abuse. A 
fuller democracy in principle means that people can act as cit-
izens in all the major institutions which require their energy 
and obedience. 
Stirton and Lodge argue further that “[t]ransparency, on this 
view has moral value because it enhances individual autonomy 
by involving citizens directly in the process of making decisions 
which affect their lives and interests” and “enhances individual 
autonomy to the extent that transparent institutions are pre-
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dictable, allowing individuals to order their own private choices 
knowing the way that these are affected by public decisions.”186 
In the view of Koppell, “[t]ransparency is the literal value of 
accountability, the idea that an accountable bureaucrat and 
organization must explain or account for his actions.”187 Addi-
tionally, “[t]ransparency is most important as an instrument 
for assessing organizational performance, a key requirement 
for all other dimensions of accountability.”188 Citizens, includ-
ing those of the African countries, place a high value on trans-
parency and openness in the operation of their governments—
citizens are interested in knowing how public policies are de-
signed and implemented, especially those which have a direct 
impact on their lives.189 Considering the negative impact that 
corruption has on the lives of many people, and considering al-
so the fact that transparency tends to minimize engagement in 
corrupt behaviors, it is no wonder that citizens are interested 
in transparency. 
Transparency is also a critical element of a trustworthy gov-
ernmental regime. As argued by Fairbanks, Plowman, and 
Rawlins, where government communicators undertake their 
operations in a transparent and open manner, such an ap-
proach is likely to garner significant support for the govern-
ment.190 Specifically, the benefits of transparent communica-
tion practices by the government include “increased public 
support, increased understanding by the public of agency ac-
tions, increased trust, increased compliance with agency rules 
and regulations, an increased ability for the agency to accom-
plish its [sic] purpose and a stronger democracy.”191 In order for 
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government communicators to achieve transparency, they 
“must adopt practices that promote open information sharing. 
These include working to enhance agency relationships with 
the publics they serve through responding to public needs, 
seeking and incorporating feedback and getting information 
out to the public through a variety of channels.”192 
From their study of transparency, Fairbanks, Plowman, and 
Rawlins also conclude that “[t]ransparency in the decision 
making process, quells the fear that decisions in government 
agencies have been made as a result of undue political or in-
dustry influence because the process is open to the public.”193 
They also determined that transparency in government opera-
tions produces “a feeling of trust in [one’s] government and the 
ability to realize a comfort in understanding that [one is] being 
treated equally with others and that the government is work-
ing in [one’s] best interest.”194 For Africa, this is an important 
and critical point—effective management of ethnic and reli-
gious diversity requires that all groups within the country feel 
that they are being treated equally and that the process of de-
signing and implementing public policies is not being used to 
marginalize them. Of course, one way to restore a feeling of 
trust among a country’s diverse population groups in their gov-
ernment is to make certain that public operations are as trans-
parent as possible. 
One of the most important outcomes of the top-down, elite-
driven, non-participatory approach to constitution-making is 
that many of today’s governance systems in the African coun-
tries do not offer citizens the wherewithal to hold their civil 
servants and political leaders accountable. In these countries, 
those who serve in government are neither accountable to civil 
society, nor to the constitution.195 As the struggle to improve 
governance in the continent continues, it is important for Afri-
cans to recognize that an effective way to enhance accountabil-
ity is to mandate transparency in the performance of public-
sector activities. First, transparency can force civil servants 
and political elites to be accountable to the citizens that they 
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serve, and second, transparency “can also act as an incentive 
for people to participate in collective action and it facilitates 
the spread of innovation and technical change.”196 
An African country interested in improving governance and 
minimizing public-sector opportunism by implementing trans-
parency in, say, government communications, should consider 
the following. First, in all its activities or operations, the gov-
ernment must adopt a policy that values “open, honest and 
timely” communication with citizens and must avoid the ma-
nipulation of information, a process that has become part of the 
survival strategy of many authoritarian regimes in the conti-
nent.197 Second, all individuals who communicate on behalf of 
the government—civil servants, political elites, and other 
agents of the government—should adopt “practices that pro-
mote open information sharing.” 198  Third, the government, 
while taking into consideration issues of privacy, should work 
closely with bureau managers to “create an organizational 
structure that supports transparency.”199 And fourth, all gov-
ernment communicators should be provided with enough access 
to time, staff, and monetary resources.200 One must note, how-
ever, that although openness and transparency are desirable 
qualities in a democratic government, care must be taken so 
that the private rights of citizens are not violated. While it is 
critical that the law provides public communicators with the 
tools to enhance openness and transparency, the law should 
also constrain these communicators in order to make certain 
that they or their activities do not violate the privacy rights of 
citizens. 
Since the emergence of the Internet as a viable mode of com-
munication, the “e-government” model has been recommended 
as an effective way, even for money-strapped developing coun-
tries, to improve transparency.201 According to Pina, Torres and 
Royo: 
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[t]he interactivity of the Internet is expected to make gov-
ernments more responsive to the needs and demands of citi-
zens. More information delivered in a more timely fashion to 
citizens is expected to increase the transparency of govern-
ment and to empower citizens to monitor government perfor-
mance more closely. E-government is therefore viewed as a 
positive channel for enhancing trust in governments through 
government accountability and by empowering citizens.202 
The e-government model has the potential to significantly 
improve transparency and openness, and hence, accountability 
in the governments of developed countries such as the United 
States and those of the EU. However, one must note that in 
many African countries, where the Internet is still in its em-
bryonic stages, and only a few privileged groups and individu-
als are able to access it, this potential for transparency has yet 
to be exploited.203 An important way for the government to im-
prove transparency is to make certain that all its agencies and 
departments develop websites and publish information about 
their operations on these websites so that citizens can easily 
access this data. In order for this to materialize in Africa, how-
ever, each African government must first provide the appropri-
ate infrastructure for enhancing the ability of each citizen to 
have full and effective access to the Internet. Additionally, gov-
ernments should accelerate their efforts to improve access to 
education, especially at the primary level, so that the popula-
tion—notably members of historically disadvantaged groups, 
including women and girls, rural inhabitants, and minority 
ethnic groups—can accumulate the human capital needed to 
enhance their ability to benefit from the new information tech-
nology. As part of the process to improve access to education, 
the government should make sure that facilities are provided 
in the rural areas, as well as to adult learners, so that they can 
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participate fully and effectively in the new knowledge-based 
economy. Of course, given the fact that most people in the Afri-
can countries are not literate in their country’s national lan-
guage,204 it may be necessary for the government to provide in-
formation to citizens in their own languages. Thus, a decentral-
ized form of information provision, which empowers local or 
sub-national governments to develop and maintain the public 
websites on which information about government operations 
can be placed, may be advisable. 
In the struggle against those factors that constrain wealth 
creation in Africa, such as corruption and rent seeking, open-
ness and transparency can serve as important tools. In addition 
to the fact that openness and transparency significantly in-
crease and improve accountability, and hence, minimize cor-
ruption and rent seeking, transparency and openness also en-
hance the participation of citizens in governance; a process that 
enhances the ability of the government to effectively fight cor-
ruption. 
F. Predictability 
As the ABA205 and several legal scholars and philosophers206 
have argued, a very important element of the rule of law is that 
the law must not be administered arbitrarily and capriciously. 
It is important that citizens be able to “expect predictable re-
sults from the legal system.”207 By “predictable results,” the 
ABA means that “people who act in the same way can expect 
the law to treat them in the same way.”208 
In countries in which the common law is the foundation for 
the legal system, “courts contribute to the rule of law through 
their authority to make common law rules and to interpret leg-
islation and constitutions; those actions shape the legal envi-
ronment in which citizens order their economic and personal 
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affairs.”209 When courts make law, unlike legislatures and ad-
ministrative tribunals, they are “not subject to democratic pro-
cesses that ensure citizens’ participation in the creation of new 
rules or the alteration of existing ones.”210 Courts employ the 
informal norm of stare decisis to promote and advance critical 
elements of the rule of law, such as stability and predictabil-
ity.211 If a country’s legal system follows the norm of stare deci-
sis, then that country’s courts will not reject legal authority es-
tablished by the ruling of an earlier court if the facts presented 
in the extant case—the case currently waiting to be decided—
are analogous to those of the case whose decision produced the 
legal authority.212 By maintaining fidelity to precedent and the 
informal stare decisis norm, courts significantly enhance the 
stability and predictability of the law. 
U.S. courts have recognized the critical role played by adher-
ence to precedent, contributing to legal stability in the United 
States. In a U.S. Supreme Court decision, John R. Sand & 
Gravel Company v. U.S.,213 the Court held that 
even if the Government cannot show detrimental reliance on 
our earlier cases, our reexamination of well-settled precedent 
could nevertheless prove harmful. Justice Brandeis once ob-
served that ‘in most matters it is more important that the ap-
plicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.’ To 
overturn a decision settling one such matter simply because 
we might believe that decision is [no] longer ‘right’ would in-
evitably reflect a willingness to reconsider others. And that 
willingness could itself threaten to substitute disruption, con-
fusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal stability.214 
In certain circumstances, however, it might be necessary to 
forego adherence to precedent for public policy reasons—that 
is, if the courts determine that doing so would further im-
portant societal objectives. What is important to note here is 
that while adherence or fidelity to precedent is important for 
achieving legal stability, the latter must not be achieved or se-
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cured at the expense of making the law so rigid and unbending 
that it becomes “impervious to changing societal norms and 
practices.”215 Judges, then, should be granted the discretion to 
occasionally decline to follow precedent in order to meet certain 
well-defined societal needs or objectives. Of course, if judges do 
opt to ignore or not follow precedent, and as a consequence cre-
ate new law, they must appreciate the fact that the new law 
they create will invariably produce a new set of constraints, 
separate from those that had been created by the previous and 
now overruled law, by which citizens must now abide. Addi-
tionally, judges must recognize that frequent changes in the 
law, through judges’ failure to follow precedent, can create an 
unstable legal regime, severely constraining the ability of citi-
zens to use the law to organize or order their private lives. 
Stare decisis is an effective, although informal, norm that can 
be used by judges to improve and enhance stability of the legal 
system. Nevertheless, judges can and do overrule existing prec-
edent in an effort to make certain that the law continues to 
evolve and maintain its relevance to citizens’ lives and values. 
If, however, judges “frequently change the status quo by over-
ruling precedent, it produces an unstable legal environment 
that creates greater difficulty for citizens to predict the legal 
consequences of their actions or transactions in the future.”216 
Judges must balance maintaining legal stability, a desirable 
goal in any society, with the need to make sure that the law 
does not remain stagnant and is dynamic enough to meet evolv-
ing societal needs. Because legal stability is an important ele-
ment of the rule of law, it is critical in Africa’s fight against 
corruption and other growth-inhibiting behaviors. As argued by 
Judge Diane P. Wood of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, “the laws must not be arbitrary.”217 
G. The Protection of Human Rights 
Constitution-making and the practice of constitutionalism in 
the United States have, historically, been based on the belief by 
the Founding Fathers and subsequent leaders and social re-
formers that the Constitution and the laws derived from such a 
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document would guarantee and protect citizens’ fundamental 
rights. 218  In a similar fashion, many of the Africans 219  who 
fought for or supported and sustained the decolonization pro-
ject believed that the post-independence dispensation would be 
built on a foundation of respect for human and fundamental 
rights. Specifically, many Africans believed that the immedi-
ate- or post-independence government would engage each coun-
try’s diverse population groups in democratic constitution-
making to produce and adopt institutional arrangements capa-
ble of constraining the state, protecting human rights, enhanc-
ing peaceful coexistence, and promoting entrepreneurship and 
the creation of wealth, especially among historically marginal-
ized and deprived groups and communities, such as women, 
rural inhabitants, minority ethnic groups, and the urban 
poor.220 
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Throughout the post-independence period in Africa, the in-
digenous elites who captured the evacuated structures of colo-
nial hegemony did not undertake the type of constitution-
making and institutional reforms that would have produced 
legal and judicial systems capable of ensuring the rule of law 
and guaranteeing the protection of human rights. On the con-
trary, most of the continent’s post-independence political elites 
engaged in top-down, elite-driven, opaque, and non-
participatory approaches to constitution-making, resulting in 
laws and institutions that were not capable of protecting the 
fundamental rights of citizens. 221  In addition, post-
independence law-making was also top-down, non-
participatory, and monopolized by elites at the center, many of 
whom lacked the legitimacy to rule and legislate because they 
did not secure their positions through popular and free elec-
tions. 
It is generally believed, at least in the West, that the modern 
movement to protect human rights began with the signing of 
the Magna Carta in 1215 by King John of England, recognizing 
the rights of some of his subjects. According to Chapter 39 of 
the Magna Carta: 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his 
rights and possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of 
his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force 
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against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful 
judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.222 
As argued by the ABA, the Magna Carta “planted the seed for 
the concept of due process as it developed first in England, and 
then in the United States. Due process means that everyone is 
entitled to a fair and impartial hearing to determine their legal 
rights.”223 Countries whose legal systems are based on the An-
glo-American legal and cultural tradition look to the Magna 
Carta as an important source of many elements of their legal 
systems, especially those dealing with individual rights. Many 
of the countries that came into being after World War II, how-
ever, consider the U.N. General Assembly’s adoption, in 1948, 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the founda-
tion for the modern movement to protect human rights.224 Since 
1948, the U.N. has adopted several other conventions and cov-
enants, all designed to enhance the protection of human 
rights.225 
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Most African countries have signed and ratified these cove-
nants and conventions.226 In addition, many of these countries 
have inserted, within their constitutions, clauses that suppos-
edly guarantee the protection of human rights.227 Unfortunate-
ly, throughout the continent, these rights are regularly violated 
by both state- and non-state actors. Part of the reason why 
these rights are not being protected is that African countries 
have failed to provide themselves with the tools to do so—it is 
very difficult for the fundamental rights of citizens to be pro-
tected in a country whose legal system does not guarantee the 
rule of law. For example, if law is not supreme and those who 
serve in government consider themselves to be above the law, 
they are more likely to act with impunity and engage in activi-
                                                                                                             
vention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1966); International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
(1973); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (1979). See P.R. GHANDHI, BLACKSTONE’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS DOCUMENTS (4th ed. 2004). 
 226. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which opened for signature on December 19, 1966, has either been granted 
accession or ratification by many African countries. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED 




 227. For example, Chapter Five of the Constitution of the Republic of Gha-
na is headed “Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms” and contains the 
following: 
(1) The fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in this 
chapter shall be respected and upheld by the Executive, Legislature 
and Judiciary and all other organs of government and its agencies 
and, where applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons in 
Ghana, and shall be enforceable by the Courts as provided for in this 
Constitution. 
(2) Every person in Ghana, whatever his race, place of origin, politi-
cal opinion, color, religion, creed or gender shall be entitled to the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual contained 
in this Chapter but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others and for the public interest. 
In addition, Chapter Eighteen of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 
establishes a Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, 
which is charged with making certain that the rights guaranteed by the con-
stitution are protected. See Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), ch. 
18. 
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ties that violate the rights of citizens.228 Civil servants in many 
African countries engage in opportunistic approaches to the 
allocation of public services, and in the process, deprive many 
citizens, especially the poor, from having access to welfare-
enhancing and in many instances, life-saving services, such as 
police protection, clean water, basic health care, prenatal care, 
shelter, and nutrition, especially for children.229 
As part of the effort to improve national legal and judicial 
systems in order to provide an enabling environment for the 
creation of wealth, each African country must make certain 
that the new institutional arrangements guarantee citizens’ 
fundamental rights. Each African country must make certain 
that its “legal processes are sufficiently robust and accessible to 
ensure enforcement of [all] protections [of human and funda-
mental rights] by an independent legal profession.”230 
On May 25, 2011, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (“OECD”) released its Guidelines for Multi-
national Enterprises (“OECD Guidelines”) as part of the effort 
to improve global governance and enhance the ability of multi-
national companies to operate in the global economy. The 
OECD Guidelines make specific reference to human rights and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Specifically, the 
Guidelines expressly demand that OECD-based multinational 
companies “[r]espect the internationally recognised human 
rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the 
host government’s international obligations and commit-
ments.”231 However, despite the fact that during the last sever-
al decades, multilateral agencies such as the OECD, have pro-
vided several legal instruments to fight corruption and protect 
human rights, it must be reiterated that fighting corruption 
and protecting human rights in Africa is the responsibility of 
each African government. Thus, each country must provide an 
institutional environment that enhances the eradication of cor-
                                                                                                             
 228. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REALIZING THE 
PROMISE FOR OURSELVES (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im ed., 2003) (examining 
the struggle to protect human rights in Africa in general, and in specific Afri-
can countries in particular—Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Uganda). 
 229. See, e.g., MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 110. 
 230. Stein, supra note 70, at 302. 
 231. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (OECD, 2011), § II(2). 
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ruption and the protection of human rights. Such an enabling 
environment is built on a foundation of the rule of law. 
IV. FURTHER INSIGHTS INTO THE RULE OF LAW AS A CATALYST 
FOR DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
A. Introduction 
Many studies have been devoted to uncovering the reasons 
for Africa’s underdevelopment and inability to achieve high 
levels of human development.232 These studies have placed the 
constraints on economic performance and the failure to signifi-
cantly improve living conditions for Africans into two catego-
ries—external and internal. 233  Identified as external con-
straints to Africa’s failure to develop are (1) natural disas-
ters;234  (2) the international financial system;235  and (3) the 
economic policies of the Western developed countries such as 
the United States, European Union, and other members of the 
OECD.236 
Internal constraints to development include (4) corruption; 
(5) highly ineffective economic infrastructures; (6) low domestic 
savings rates; (7) trade dependence; 237  (8) high population 
growth rates; (9) political instability;238 (10) military interven-
                                                                                                             
 232. See generally ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 
supra note 1; WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO 
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY (1989); Z. Ergas, In 
Search of Development: Some Directions for Further Investigation, 24 J. MOD. 
AFR. STUD. 303 (1986); MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, 
at 21–42. 
 233. John Mukum Mbaku, Constitutional Discourse and the Development of 
Structures for Sustainable Development in Africa, 22 J. STUD. ECON. 
ECONOMETRICS 1 (1998). 
 234. Natural disasters include droughts, floods, and locusts. 
 235. Many Africans believe that the international financial system discrim-
inates against exporters from the continent and makes it very difficult for the 
continent to participate gainfully in the global economy. 
 236. Mbaku, supra note 233, at 4. 
 237. Most African countries carry out the bulk of their export and import 
trade with their former colonizers and little or no trade with their neighbors. 
 238. Here, political instability includes that caused by violent mobilization 
by ethnic and religious groups, which believe they are or have been marginal-
ized by a central government dominated and controlled by other groups. 
Some of this ethnic-induced political instability includes civil wars in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Ethiopia. 
See generally MADIEBO, supra note 170 (providing an eye-witness account of 
2013] RULE OF LAW 1031 
tion in politics; and (11) external debts that these countries 
have not been able to service and repay.239 By the late 1970s, 
some scholars had begun to include, as a cause of underdevel-
opment in the continent, “policy mistakes made by well-
meaning but poorly educated and incompetent officials.”240 The 
scholars called for greater emphasis to be placed on recruiting 
and bringing into the public sector individuals who were “bet-
ter trained, honest, more disciplined and skilled,”241 in order to 
provide a more enabling environment for economic growth and 
development. Many of these scholars believed that the main 
problem in Africa was the absence of effective public policies 
capable of enhancing investment in the productive sectors and 
advancing the creation of wealth.242 The suggestion was that 
more honest and competent individuals should be placed in the 
bureaucracies.243 
In many of these immediate post-independence debates about 
economic development in Africa, little or no emphasis was 
placed on institutions and their impact on entrepreneurship 
and wealth creation. However, along with the interest in the 
transition to democratic governance that began in the conti-
nent shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the de-
mise of socialism in Eastern Europe, many scholars began to 
study the impact of institutions on macroeconomic perfor-
                                                                                                             
the Nigerian civil war); Uwechue, supra note 128 (providing an examination 
of the causes and consequences of the civil war that lasted from 1967 to 
1970); MARK HUBAND, THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR (1998) (providing an account 
of the Liberian civil war); KIEH, JR., supra note 169 (detailing the causes of 
the Liberian civil war); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: 
COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (2001) (examining the 
events that led to the genocide in Rwanda); GEBRU TAREKE, THE ETHIOPIAN 
REVOLUTION: WAR ON THE HORN OF AFRICA (2009) (providing a history of Ethi-
opia with specific emphasis on its civil wars); D.H. JOHNSON, THE ROOT 
CAUSES OF SUDAN’S CIVIL WARS (2003) (exploring the economic, social, politi-
cal, and religious causes of Sudan’s various civil wars). See also HEALING THE 
WOUND: PERSONAL NARRATIVES ABOUT THE 2007 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN 
KENYA (Kimani Njogu ed., 2009) (presenting a series of narratives by individ-
uals who were either directly involved in or affected by the ethnic-induced 
post-election violence in Kenya in 2007). 
 239. Mbaku, supra note 233, at 5; MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 1, at 71–114; Ergas, supra note 232, at 304. 
 240. Mbaku, supra note 233, at 5. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
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mance.244 This new literature on African development argued 
that “[t]he inability or unwillingness of entrepreneurs in the 
African countries to engage in wealth-creating activities can be 
linked to poorly developed, non-viable, and weak institutions 
that were adopted at independence.”245 In addition to the fact 
that the institutional arrangements adopted by African coun-
tries at independence were incapable of providing the where-
withal for the effective management of ethnic and religious di-
versity, they did not foster and promote entrepreneurial activi-
ties or promote wealth creation. Additionally, they failed to ad-
equately constrain civil servants and politicians, and as a re-
sult, these economies were pervaded by corruption, financial 
malfeasance, rent seeking, and other forms of political oppor-
tunism.246 
Although part of Africa’s underdevelopment was attributed to 
the absence of effective leadership, later studies determined 
that while competent leadership is necessary, it is not a suffi-
cient condition for sustainable economic growth and develop-
ment.247 Each country must be provided with laws and institu-
tions that “provide the appropriate incentive system for market 
participants” 248  to engage in wealth creation and economic 
growth. These institutions are those that guarantee the rule of 
law. 
                                                                                                             
 244. See generally MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA, supra note 
1 (showing how the lack of effective institutions has contributed significantly 
to poor economic performance in the African countries); MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS 
AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1 (discussing the failure of development theory 
and the rise of public choice theory as a more effective mechanism to explain 
African underdevelopment). See also TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 3 (discussing transition to democratic governance as 
a way to improve not only peaceful coexistence, but also wealth creation, and 
hopefully, economic development). 
 245. Mbaku, supra note 233, at 5. 
 246. See generally John Mukum Mbaku, Bureaucratic Corruption and the 
Crisis of Institutional Reforms in Africa, 8 BUS. & CONT. WORLD 145 (1996); 
John Mukum Mbaku, Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of 
Cleanups, 16 CATO J. 99 (1996). 
 247. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA, supra note 1; J.D. 
Gwartney & R.E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Representative 
Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3 (J.D. 
Gwartney & R.E. Wagner eds., 1988). 
 248. Mbaku, supra note 233, at 5. 
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B. The Rule of Law as a Catalyst for Development in Africa 
By far, one of the most important constraints to wealth crea-
tion and economic growth in Africa is corruption.249 Part of the 
reason why corruption is virtually endemic in many African 
countries today is the fact that the institutional arrangements 
in these countries have failed to guarantee the supremacy of 
law.250 Where the law is supreme, civil servants and political 
elites are effectively and adequately constrained, and are pre-
vented from engaging in corruption and other growth-
inhibiting behaviors. In Africa today, many of the continent’s 
political leaders, including civil servants, consider themselves 
above the law and regularly engage in various forms of oppor-
tunism to “enrich themselves at the expense of those they are 
supposed to serve.”251 In a study of corruption in Cameroon, 
Jua252 determined that “public discussion and/or criticism of 
the alleged acts of some members of the ruling class is still ta-
boo.”253 In August 2012, just a little over a year since South 
Sudan became an independent country, it was already “en-
gulfed in scandals over top officials allegedly looting the treas-
ury.”254 This is due, of course, to the failure of the new nation to 
provide its various peoples with institutional arrangements 
that adequately and effectively constrain civil servants and pol-
                                                                                                             
 249. MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 4. 
 250. Note that although some African constitutions purport to guarantee 
the supremacy of law, the practice is that some individuals, especially those 
who hold high-ranking positions in government, still consider themselves 
above the law. For example, Cameroon’s 1996 Constitution limited the presi-
dent to two consecutive terms of seven years in office. Yet, in 2008, Paul Biya, 
who had already served two terms of seven years each in office as president, 
basically ignored the law and used his position in the party to have the con-
stitution changed so that he could contest the presidency again. Thus, despite 
the fact that he had agreed in 1996 to the two-term limit, he was still willing 
to subvert the existing laws to maximize his interests. 
 251. MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 118–19. 
 252. Jua, supra note 114. 
 253. Id. at 166. Although this study was completed in 1991, the situation 
has not changed significantly. Fombad’s 2004 study found similar acts of im-
punity by civil servants and politicians. Charles Manga Fombad, The Dynam-
ics of Record-breaking Endemic Corruption and Political Opportunism in 
Cameroon, in THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE IN AFRICA: CAMEROON UNDER PAUL 
BIYA 357 (John Mukum Mbaku & Joseph Takougang eds., 2004). 
 254. John Burnett, At Age One, A Tattered Reputation for South Sudan, at 
http://www.npr.org/2012/08/02/157791705/at-age-one-a-tattered-reputation-
for-south-sudan (last visited Aug. 3, 2012). 
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iticians—in other words, laws and institutions that guarantee 
the rule of law, and hence, force all citizens, including those 
who serve in the government, to remain subservient to the law. 
Unless this is done, corruption, rent seeking, and other forms 
of opportunism will remain pervasive, as civil servants and pol-
iticians continue to act with impunity, and entrepreneurs will 
find it extremely difficult to engage in those activities that cre-
ate wealth. 
Colonialism, as has been argued by many scholars,255 was not 
a mutually beneficial arrangement between Africans and the 
Europeans. Instead, it was a cruel, opportunistic, repressive, 
violent, and highly exploitative system designed to capture 
benefits for the metropolitan economies and the Europeans res-
ident in the colonies.256 As a consequence, the laws and institu-
tions that the Europeans established in each colony to help 
them manage the local populations and enhance their ability to 
appropriate African resources were not democratic, but were 
instead designed to keep the Europeans—the governors of the 
colonies—above the law.257 In fact, the Europeans who colo-
nized Africa made no effort to either utilize already existing 
indigenous institutions—which in the past had proven quite 
effective and efficient in the peaceful resolution of conflict and 
the promotion of domestic production systems—or engage the 
African populations in either deepening existing institutions, or 
designing more effective systems of governance.258 Rather, Af-
                                                                                                             
 255. See, e.g., Fatton, Jr., supra note 27, at 457. 
 256. See id. at 457–58. 
 257. In the French colonies, for example, the policy of assimilation, and lat-
er, association, created two legal systems, one for “indigenes” and another for 
French citizens and those few Africans who had been assimilated to the 
French cultural ideal. Under this system, French citizens in the colonies 
functioned essentially above the law. See generally JOHN D. HARGREAVES, 
WEST AFRICA: THE FORMER FRENCH STATES (1967); JOHN D. HARGREAVES, 
FRANCE AND WEST AFRICA: AN ANTHOLOGY OF HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS (1969); 
VIRGINIA THOMPSON & RICHARD ADLOFF, FRENCH WEST AFRICA (Greenwood, 
1969). For a description of the dual legal system in the U.N. Trust Territory 
of Cameroons under French administration, see VICTOR T. LEVINE, THE 
CAMEROONS: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE (Hoover Institution, 1964); 
LeVine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism, supra note 54. 
 258. In a series of articles published in the Africa Peace and Conflict Jour-
nal, several authors argue that “indigenous cultural practices and traditional 
structures of leadership” can play a very significant role in enhancing peace-
ful coexistence and effective governance in Africa. Tim Murithi, Guest Edi-
tor’s Note, 2 AFR. PEACE CONFLICT J. 1 (2009). Martha Mutisi examines 
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rican traditional institutions were destroyed to make way for 
the introduction and sustaining of laws and institutions that 
enhanced European seizure, forceful possession, and exploita-
tion of colonial resources for the benefit of the metropolitan 
economies.259 
At independence, many African countries failed to engage 
their populations in democratic constitution-making to secure 
more effective institutional arrangements to replace those left 
by the colonialists. For example, in the francophone countries, 
except for Guinea, national constitutions were based on the 
French Constitution of 1958, and not on robust national consti-
tutional discourses. In addition to the fact that these top-down, 
elite-driven, and non-participatory approaches to constitution-
making forced these countries to adopt institutional arrange-
ments that did not reflect the people’s values and aspirations, 
they also failed to adequately constrain the state. Perhaps 
more importantly, throughout Africa, citizens came to see these 
constitutions, and the laws that were enacted under them, as 
foreign impositions designed to maximize the interests of the 
new leaders and their foreign benefactors. Few Africans came 
to accept and respect their post-independence laws and institu-
tions. Even as late as the 1990s, francophone countries in Afri-
ca were still using the Constitution of the French Fifth Repub-
lic as the model for “constructing” their laws and institutions. 
For example, in a study of the post-Cold War democratization 
process in Mauritania, Ould-Mey determined that “[t]he July 
                                                                                                             
Rwanda’s gacaca as an instrument for addressing legal issues associated with 
or arising out of the country’s genocide and concludes that the gacaca can 
play a significant role in restorative justice; Susan Kilonzo, Sussy Kurgat & 
Simon Omare take a look at “taboos” and how they can be used to effectively 
deal with natural resource management and conservation issues in Kenya. 
They conclude that taboos can serve just as well as formal legal mechanisms 
in helping minimize overexploitation and degradation of the environment. 
Martha Mutisi, Gacaca Courts in Rwanda: An Endogenous Approach to Post-
conflict Justice and Reconciliation, 2 AFR. PEACE CONFLICT J. 17 (2009); S.M. 
Kilonzo, S.G. Kurgat & S.G. Omare, The Role of Taboos in the Management of 
Natural Resources and Peace-building: A Case Study of the Kakamega Forest 
in Western Kenya, 2 AFR. PEACE CONFLICT J. 39 (2009). 
 259. See, e.g., Julius O. Ihonvbere & John Mukum Mbaku, Introduction: 
Establishing Generalities and Specificities in Africa’s Struggle for Democracy 
and Development, in POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN 
AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY EXPERIENCES, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
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1991 Constitution [of Mauritania] was essentially based on the 
Constitution of the French Fifth Republic of October 1958.”260 
Yet, voluntary acceptance of and respect for a country’s laws 
significantly lower the costs of maintaining compliance.261 Be-
cause many Africans view their present legal and judicial insti-
tutions as alien impositions designed for the benefit of the rul-
ing elites—and not for helping the people govern themselves, 
organize their private lives, and deal with daily problems and 
conflicts—they have rejected these laws and the civil servants 
and governmental agencies that enforce them. African coun-
tries can only resolve this problem, of the failure of the majori-
ty of citizens to accept, respect, and trust the law, by engaging 
in the type of institutional reconstruction that allows each 
country to replace the legal and judiciary systems inherited 
from the Europeans with structures that are more locally-
focused and reflect the values, interests, aspirations, and cus-
toms and traditions of each country’s relevant stakeholder 
groups. This can only be achieved by engaging the people in 
democratic constitution-making—given the opportunity, then, 
the people will choose laws that they can respect, accept, and 
obey, and which would enhance their ability to live together 
peacefully and engage in those activities that maximize their 
values, including creating the wealth that they need to meet 
their obligations. 
                                                                                                             
 260. Mohameden Ould-Mey, Structural Adjustment Programs and Democ-
ratization in Africa, in MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CHANGE: 
CONSTRAINTS TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 35, 49 (John Mukum Mbaku & 
Julius O. Ihonvbere eds., 1998). 
 261. In a recent paper on compliance with the law, Levi, Tyler, and Sacks 
argue that “[g]overnments are most dependent upon the cooperation of their 
citizens under those circumstances in which they are least able to obtaining it 
via the mechanisms [of surveillance and sanctioning] or reward and punish-
ment.” They argue further that although it is possible for a governmental 
regime to rule the country using only coercive force, ruling with “legitimate 
power makes governing easier and more effective.” Where citizens consider 
government legitimate, they are more likely to voluntarily accept and respect 
the government’s laws and regulations. Where government is considered by 
the citizens to be illegitimate, officials have to “expend more resources in 
monitoring and enforcement to induce sacrifice and compliance.” Thus, the 
“existence of legitimacy reduces the transaction costs of governing by reduc-
ing reliance on coercion and monitoring.” Margaret Levi, Tom Tyler & Audrey 
Sacks, Draft, The Reasons for Compliance with Law, Paper for the Workshop 
on the Rule of Law, Yale University, Mar. 28–29, 2008, 
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/ruleoflaw/papers/ReasonsforCompliance.pdf. 
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The creation of wealth requires that a country possess a legal 
and judicial system that can provide the wherewithal for the 
resolution of conflicts arising from trade and other forms of 
mutually beneficial exchange.262 In order for the judicial system 
to function effectively in this capacity, it must be made a coe-
qual partner in governance with the other branches of govern-
ment—typically, the executive and legislative—meaning, there 
must be judicial independence. If the judiciary becomes subser-
vient to the executive, it is likely to be used by the latter to 
maximize its interests and those of its supporters. In response, 
groups within the country that consider themselves marginal-
ized may resort to violent mobilization, a process that can ex-
acerbate political and economic instability, and make it diffi-
cult for the country to attract the investment needed for eco-
nomic growth and development. 
As much as judicial independence is a critical factor in creat-
ing the appropriate institutional environment for wealth crea-
tion in Africa, many countries in the continent continue to have 
problems when it comes to the actual practice of this concept. 
While many constitutions in the continent actually “honor con-
ventional separation-of-powers principles by organizing the 
                                                                                                             
 262. As an example, consider conflicts arising from the failure of one party 
to a contract to live up to or abide by the terms of the contract. Although 
many conflicts associated with private contracts are often resolved by the 
parties themselves, without the involvement of the judiciary system, many 
contract disputes end up in court. Individuals or businesses intending to in-
vest in an economy usually consider the legal mechanisms for resolving con-
flicts arising from contract disputes as critical to their decision to commit 
funds to the economy in question. Studies by economists have shown that a 
country’s legal structure and protection of property rights are very important 
for wealth creation. See JAMES GWARTNEY & ROBERT LAWSON, ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 35–37 (The Fraser Institute, 
2004). In addition, the ability of a country to attract and retain the skilled 
labor resources—in other words, human capital—needed for productive en-
trepreneurial activities is dependent on, inter alia, the quality of its legal 
system. In fact, the poor quality of legal systems in many African countries is 
a major contributing factor to “brain drain,” the migration of highly-skilled 
manpower from the African countries to the industrialized economies of the 
West and the failure of these economies to attract highly-skilled manpower 
from the developed economies. See generally ARNO TANNER, EMIGRATION, 
BRAIN DRAIN AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2005); 
THE BRAIN DRAIN OF HEALTH PROFESSIONALS FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TO 
CANADA (Jonathan Crush ed., 2006); J. M. SIBRY TAPSOBA, BRAIN DRAIN AND 
CAPACITY BUILDING IN AFRICA (2000). 
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courts into a separate, self-managed branch of government 
with exclusive functions and jurisdiction,”263 judicial independ-
ence is rarely realized in practice in these countries. As argued 
by Prempeh,264 many African governments, pressured by “in-
ternational donors and creditor nations to demonstrate their 
democratic credentials,”265 provide their countries with a “for-
mal constitutional guarantee of judicial independence,”266 but 
in reality, “judicial independence remains vulnerable to politi-
cal control.”267 Throughout the continent, many judiciaries are 
unable to maintain the independence guaranteed to them by 
the constitution because other critical aspects or elements of 
judicial independence are missing—such judiciaries usually 
lack the authority to control their own budgets, because the 
power of the purse is vested either with the executive or legis-
lative branches. They also lack “security of tenure” and “insti-
tutional independence.” 268  For example, as determined by 
Fombad in a study of the Cameroon judiciary, the president of 
the Republic not only has the power to “guarantee” the inde-
pendence of the judiciary,269 but also directly controls all finan-
cial matters dealing with the judiciary.270 Prempeh states that 
the dependence of African judiciaries on the executive and leg-
islative branches is worsened by “the fact that the judiciary has 
historically been severely under-resourced, leaving it with in-
adequate and outmoded technology, dilapidated and over-
crowded courthouses and offices, and underpaid judges and 
staff.”271 
So that there can be peaceful coexistence of each country’s di-
verse ethnic and religious groups, which is critical for engage-
ment in those productive activities that create wealth and en-
hance human development, judicial independence must not on-
ly be guaranteed in the constitution, but the necessary institu-
tional facilities must be provided so that the judiciary can real-
ize that independence in practice. For example, as has been 
                                                                                                             
 263. Prempeh, supra note 139, at 1305. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 1304–05. 
 266. Id. at 1305. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See Van Rooyen v. The State (2002)[5]SA 246[CC], para. 29. 
 269. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, arts. 37(2), (3). 
 270. Fombad, supra note 100, at 247–48. 
 271. Prempeh, supra note 139, at 1305. 
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made clear by South Africa’s Constitutional Court,272 the judi-
ciary must be provided the minimum requirements for judicial 
independence, which are (1) “security of tenure”; (2) “a basic 
degree of financial security”; and (3) “institutional independ-
ence.”273 
Corruption and rent seeking are major constraints to the cre-
ation of wealth in Africa.274 One of the most effective ways to 
deal with corruption is to make certain that public policies are 
undertaken in an open and transparent manner. In addition to 
the fact that openness and transparency can significantly im-
prove the efficiency of the public sector, they can also force civil 
servants and politicians to be more accountable to both the 
people and the constitution, thus, minimizing corruption, rent 
seeking, and other behaviors that stunt entrepreneurship and 
the creation of wealth. During the last fifty years, corruption 
has been pervasive throughout most African economies, mak-
ing it very difficult for these countries to develop and sustain 
the robust private sector needed to anchor each country’s 
wealth creation effort. Perhaps, more important is the fact that 
corruption deprives those at the bottom of the economic ladder 
of the opportunity to participate gainfully in the economy, as 
well as gain access to welfare-enhancing public goods and ser-
vices.275 
The protection of human rights is a critical factor in devel-
opment. For example, throughout Africa, women and girls are 
regularly abused and deprived of their fundamental rights.276 
                                                                                                             
 272. See De Lange v. Smuts (1998)[3]SA 785[CC], para. 59; Van Rooyen v. 
The State (2002)[5]SA 246[CC], para. 18. 
 273. Van Rooyen v. The State, para. 29. 
 274. See generally MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA; MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1. 
 275. MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA, supra note 1, at 109–10. 
 276. See generally Lars Almroth & Susan Elmusharaf, Genital Mutilation of 
Girls, 3 WOMEN’S HEALTH 475 (2007); Monica Antonazzo, Problems with 
Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting, 15 PEACE REV. 471 (2003); Fareda 
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In addition to the fact that such abuse significantly degrades 
the quality of life for these citizens, it also deprives them of the 
opportunity for self-actualization—for example, the opportuni-
ty to develop the human capital that they need to participate 
fully and effectively in political and economic markets, includ-
ing creating their own wealth; to access the credit that they 
need to engage in productive activities; to own real property, 
which is an important way to store one’s wealth for the future; 
and to travel, so that they can migrate to where their labor 
skills are needed the most, and earn competitive compensation 
packages for their labor services, or start and manage their 
own businesses. Throughout the continent, human rights abus-
es remain at the heart of why so many African women and girls 
are among the continent’s poorest and most materially de-
prived inhabitants. Hence, the protection of the fundamental 
rights of all citizens is critical for poverty alleviation and hu-
man development.277 
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V. THE ARAB AWAKENING: THE CONTINUING EFFORT TO 
ENHANCE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
After a Tunisian street vendor named Tarek al-Tayeb Mo-
hamed Bouazizi set himself on fire as a protest against humili-
ation by government regulators, his subsequent death provided 
the impetus to what later became a new political, economic, 
and social awakening among ordinary Tunisians.278 This awak-
ening, which was later referred to as the “Arab Spring,” mani-
fested itself in a series of grassroots anti-government protests, 
which effectively overthrew the government of Tunisia’s au-
thoritarian ruler, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, on Janu-
ary 14, 2011.279 
The pro-democracy demonstrations that began in Tunisia af-
ter Bouazizi’s self-immolation, spread to other countries in 
North Africa and the Middle East. In Egypt, citizens took to the 
streets to demand the ouster of their president, Hosni Mubar-
ak.280 Throughout this region, citizens awoke to a new way of 
thinking about human rights, governance, and development. 
They arose to demand that their governments respect their 
“basic social, political, and economic rights.” 281  Before the 
masses of these countries took to the streets to demand that 
their rights be respected, their governments had routinely “vio-
lated international law by prohibiting the rights to assemble 
and to freedom of expression” guaranteed by international con-
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ventions282 that had been ratified by these countries. Bouazizi’s 
frustration was shared by not just the masses of Tunisia, but 
by those in Egypt and other countries in the region. They 
sought the opportunity to govern themselves by determining, 
or at the very least participating in the determination of, their 
own laws, the choosing of their own leaders, and participating 
fully and effectively in the creation of wealth.283 
Generally, the Arab awakening resulted in the demise of bru-
tal governmental regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. Elec-
tions, considered relatively free by both domestic and interna-
tional observers,284 have taken place in all three countries, and 
in Egypt and Tunisia, the government has been captured by 
Islamist political parties.285 Already, there are fears, especially 
by some groups in these countries, notably women and reli-
gious minorities, that even though these new regimes came to 
power through democratic processes, they are likely to reject 
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democratic governance as soon as they have consolidated their 
power.286 
But were the events that characterized the Arab awakening 
transformative enough to provide citizens of Egypt, Libya, and 
Tunisia with institutional arrangements capable of enhancing 
peaceful coexistence, promoting entrepreneurship, especially 
among historically marginalized groups, and adequately con-
straining the state so that its custodians would not continue to 
behave with impunity as they had done prior to the “revolu-
tions”? 
The answer to the above question is that what happened in 
all three countries can better be described as “regime changes,” 
and not the type of transformative processes that could have 
produced truly democratic governmental institutions. For ex-
ample, in Egypt, the Mubarak-imposed anachronistic, oppres-
sive, exploitative, and elite-driven governance architecture re-
mains firmly in place. Egypt’s revolution did not involve the 
type of bottom-up, inclusive, participatory, and people-driven 
institutional reconstruction that would have produced institu-
tional arrangements capable of guaranteeing Egyptian citizens’ 
fundamental rights, greatly enhancing their ability to coexist 
peacefully and engage freely in productive activities to create 
the wealth that they need to deal with poverty and deprivation. 
First, the country’s first freely-elected parliament in sixty years 
was sacked by the Supreme Constitutional Court (“SCC”), an 
anachronism from the Mubarak era.287 By dissolving a demo-
cratically elected parliament, the SCC effectively quashed the 
most important achievement of the Egyptian “revolution.” Sec-
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ond, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (“SCAF”), a 
Mubarak-era institution, assumed the powers of the legisla-
ture,288 as well as some of the powers traditionally vested in the 
executive.289 In addition to the fact that the SCAF appropriated 
the power to legislate, it also made it clear to the new presi-
dent, Mohamed Morsi of the Islamic Brotherhood movement, 
that in selecting a cabinet, he had to leave the post of defense 
in the hands of the military. 290  When President Morsi an-
nounced his thirty-five member cabinet on August 2, 2012, 
Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, who was also head of the 
SCAF, retained his position as the defense minister.291 Howev-
er, on August 12, 2012, President Morsi ordered the retirement 
of the country’s two top military officers, including General 
Hussein Tantawi. The other military officer, who was head of 
the SCAF and the Defense Minister, was summarily sacked. 
Morsi then proceeded to “unilaterally [annul] constitutional 
declarations issued by SCAF that had taken the power to legis-
late out of Morsi’s hands.”292 Although Morsi, through his ac-
tions, successfully asserted civilian authority over the military, 
Egyptians have yet to engage in democratic institutional re-
forms to provide themselves with institutional arrangements 
that guarantee the rule of law. While Morsi’s actions have sig-
nificantly increased his power base and that of his Freedom 
and Justice Party, they have neither advanced nor deepened 
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sustainable democracy in the country. Moreover, they do not 
seem to have moved the country closer to acquiring legal and 
judicial systems undergirded by an adherence to the rule of 
law. 
On November 22, 2012, President Morsi issued a decree that 
granted him immunity from judicial overview or oversight.293 
Morsi, who had come into power with a reformist mission and 
had been expected by Egyptians to guide the country’s transi-
tion to democratic governance, was now engaging in practices 
common in the Mubarak dictatorship—he was acting arbitrari-
ly and capriciously, and ultra vires.294 Morsi later agreed to 
limit the scope of his November 22, 2012 decree;295 however, his 
extra-constitutional actions did not bode well for the institu-
tionalization of the rule of law in Egypt. 
In January 2013, extremely violent demonstrations envel-
oped several Egyptian cities, notably, Port Said, Suez, and Is-
mailiya, after a court sentenced twenty-one football fans to 
death for the February 2012 riot that killed over seventy peo-
ple.296 Many of the Egyptians taking part in the January 2013 
demonstrations that followed the court decision argued that 
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the courts had “scapegoated” the defendants for the events of 
February 2012. Morsi, who earlier had acted extra-
constitutionally in an effort to amass more power for himself, 
and in doing so, had ignored the nation’s courts, was now ap-
pealing to the demonstrators to respect the decisions of the 
court. He subsequently declared a thirty-day curfew and invit-
ed the opposition to a national dialogue, but the offer was re-
jected as essentially cosmetic.297 Opposition leaders indicated 
that they would continue to encourage further protests unless 
President Morsi agreed to form a more inclusive government 
and discard the recently adopted constitution.298  It now ap-
pears that what was once a dynamic, progressive, bottom-up, 
and people-driven effort to transform Egyptian institutions and 
entrench a governance system undergirded by the rule of law, 
has turned or degenerated into a top-down, elite-driven at-
tempt to impose a Mubarak-type authoritarian system in the 
country. In fact, since November 2012, when Morsi issued his 
decree, reform in Egypt has essentially degenerated into a fight 
between the SCAF, the SCC, and President Morsi for political 
supremacy. No effort is being made to engage the country’s di-
verse stakeholder groups in the type of robust discourse that 
can produce laws and institutions capable of providing an effec-
tive foundation for democratic governance. 
On January 30, 2013, amid threats from a military oblivious 
to its constitutional role, a unified Egyptian opposition invited 
President Morsi to form a government of national unity as a 
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way to halt further violent demonstrations.299 However, even if 
such a unity government is formed (as of this writing, Morsi 
had rejected the opposition’s offer300) and the destructive mobi-
lization is temporarily halted, the larger and more important 
problem of anachronistic and dysfunctional institutions will 
remain unresolved. 
Many Egyptians, Tunisians, and Libyans are feeling a signif-
icant level of frustration about their revolutions.301 That level 
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sition to democratic governance back many years. Considering the fact that 
Mr. Belaid was quite an accessible politician, who had fought to defend the 
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of frustration may be related to the fact that these revolutions 
failed to achieve their ultimate objective: to reconstruct anach-
ronistic and dysfunctional state systems, and provide the peo-
ple with governance structures capable of effectively constrain-
ing state custodians and guaranteeing the protection of the 
fundamental rights of citizens, including the prevention of vio-
lence orchestrated either by state or non-state actors against 
minorities and other vulnerable groups. The revolutions failed 
to totally transform and reconstitute the critical domains—the 
political, administrative, and judicial foundations of the state—
and as a result, citizens of these countries continue to face the 
same anachronistic institutions that had oppressed, infan-
tilized, and exploited them for years.302 Given the opportunity, 
Egyptians would definitely have engaged in the type of consti-
tution-making that would have subjected the military, includ-
ing the SCAF, to civilian control and prevented it from engag-
ing in the type of political manipulations that have allowed it 
to effectively hijack the country’s revolution and frustrate the 
people’s efforts to reform their institutions. Additionally, such 
robust and participatory constitutional discourse would have 
helped Egyptians provide themselves with laws and institu-
tions that guarantee real separation of powers, and effectively 
prevent the type of extra-constitutional behaviors and usurpa-
tion of the functions of other branches of government that have 
been exhibited by President Morsi in his efforts to acquire more 
powers for himself.303 
Like other pro-democracy groups elsewhere in the continent, 
such as those that emerged across Africa in the mid-1980s and 
early-1990s, Egypt’s new democrats believed, albeit mistaken-
ly, “that if they ousted the head of state its body would fall.”304 
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Although Egypt’s Mubarak, who for many decades had ruled 
the country with extremely efficient cruelty, is no longer in 
power, the institutional structures that supported his brutal 
dictatorship remain virtually intact. Hence, as admirable and 
as monumental as the uprising was, it was not a real trans-
formative revolution; one producing more democracy-friendly 
laws and institutions. Today, the political, administrative, and 
judicial structures that significantly enhanced the ability of the 
ancien régime to oppress and infantilize the Egyptian people 
are still intact and are being used by the “new” leadership to 
frustrate the ability of Egyptians to deepen and institutionalize 
democratic governance. 
What the Arab awakening did was offer citizens of the vari-
ous countries the opportunity to undertake the reconstruction 
and reconstituting of the anachronistic and dysfunctional state 
structures inherited from the ancien régimes, and provide laws 
and institutions capable of adequately constraining the state 
and enhancing the ability of citizens to take a more active part 
in poverty eradication through entrepreneurship and wealth 
creation. Unfortunately, the revolutions in these countries were 
still-born, and state reconstruction remains a work-in-progress. 
Of course, one can consider the new governments in Egypt, 
Libya, and Tunisia as interim or transitional governments 
whose job it is to provide the people with the wherewithal to 
undertake democratic and effective state reconstruction. One 
problem with this approach is that without effective legal con-
straints on their activities, these new governments are not like-
ly to engage the people in the type of robust dialogue that could 
lead to participatory, inclusive, and people-driven institutional 
reforms. For example, in Egypt, Morsi’s Islamic Brotherhood-
dominated Freedom and Justice party has effectively hijacked 
the process of compacting the country’s permanent constitution 
and has produced a constitution that virtually all members of 
the opposition—especially the Coptic minority, as well as sev-
eral youth, including those who engineered the uprising that 
ousted Mubarak—believe would enhance the ability of the Is-
lamists to turn Egypt into a theocracy.305 Of course, the Egyp-
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tian military remains as dominant as ever in the country’s po-
litical economy.306 Meanwhile, in Tunisia, Islamist preachers 
are pushing the Islamist-dominated government to adopt gov-
ernance structures based on Islamic law.307 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Today, Africans face three important policy priorities: (1) ef-
fectively managing ethnic and religious diversity in order to 
secure the peaceful coexistence that is critical for investment 
and the building and sustaining of wealth-creating capacity; (2) 
fostering the development of private sectors that are capable of 
producing the wealth that these countries need to deal effec-
tively with poverty and deprivation, and provide a foundation 
for eventual eradication of poverty; and (3) minimizing corrup-
tion, rent seeking, and other growth-inhibiting behaviors. 
These priorities are all interrelated. For example, the failure 
of African governments to manage ethnic and religious diversi-
ty has often resulted in destructive and violent mobilization by 
groups that perceive themselves as being marginalized by a 
central government dominated and controlled by other 
groups.308 The result has been significantly high levels of politi-
cal instability, which have created economic environments that 
are not suitable for, or conducive to, investment and/or en-
gagement by entrepreneurs in productive activities. Peaceful 
coexistence creates opportunities for mutually-beneficial ex-
changes between groups, which may include cultural exchang-
es and trade. Such exchanges can lead to innovation and the 
creation of new knowledge that can aid production and the 
peaceful resolution of problems and conflicts. 
State actors, such as civil servants and politicians, are re-
sponsible for a significant amount of the corruption and rent 
seeking that takes place in the African countries today. 309 
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Thus, to minimize the engagement of state actors in growth-
inhibiting behaviors, it is necessary that the state be adequate-
ly constrained by the constitution. To adequately restrain the 
state, the law must be supreme—no citizen, regardless of their 
political, economic, or traditional standing in society, can be 
above the law. Judicial independence must also be assured, so 
that the executive does not turn judiciary structures into in-
struments of control and plunder. In addition, the laws chosen 
must reflect the values and aspirations of citizens, that is, the 
laws need to be locally-focused, and must also be laws that citi-
zens can obey in order to enhance compliance and minimize the 
costs of policing. Furthermore, government operations must be 
conducted in an open and transparent manner to minimize cor-
ruption, enhance participation, and increase the people’s trust 
in the government. Finally, the rights of minorities must be 
protected—it is critical that the rights of minority ethnic and 
religious groups be protected, not just from state tyranny, but 
also from violence perpetuated against them by non-state ac-
tors. 
The rule of law is a critical catalyst to Africa’s effort to deal 
effectively with poverty. Each country must engage its citizens 
in democratic constitution-making to provide laws and institu-
tions that guarantee the rule of law. One must caution that 
what is being advocated here is not simple regime change as 
has occurred in many countries throughout the continent. In 
order to secure institutional arrangements that guarantee the 
rule of law, countries must engage in the type of robust state 
reconstruction that provides all of the country’s relevant stake-
holders with the wherewithal to participate fully and effective-
ly in institutional reforms. It is only through such a democratic 
process that a country can avail itself of legal and judicial 
frameworks that guarantee the rule of law, and hence, provide 
the environment for peaceful coexistence, wealth creation, and 
democratic governance. 
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